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SPECIAL TEXT NO. 8

STRATEGICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

15 February 1949

PUBLISHED AT
THE GROUND GENERAL SCHOOL
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1. **PURPOSE AND SCOPE.** *a.* The purpose of this special text is to provide those students taking army extension courses in psychological warfare specialization or in the psychological warfare aspects of military intelligence with the materials necessary to understand the history of, reasons for and functioning of modern strategic psychological warfare (or long-range propaganda).

b. It includes a brief survey of the background of psychological warfare and the principles on which it is operated; it distinguishes between *strategic* and the other fields of psychological warfare activity; it considers the organizational possibilities for psychological warfare work especially in the overseas theaters; it explains the role played by printed matter in the form of leaflets and newspapers; it emphasizes the importance of the dissemination of this printed matter and examines how this dissemination can best be obtained; finally, it analyzes the vital place of the radio in psychological warfare and states the basic principles and techniques to be followed in operating this radio activity.

2. **THE THREE FIELDS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.** It is conventional to divide psychological warfare into three categories:

a. Strategic—which consists of “timeless” general themes which can be used for long periods of time against a given enemy anywhere, either against troops or against the enemy home front.

b. Tactical—where the effort is directed primarily against enemy troops in the battle zones and where the arguments and messages are based on momentary local situations.

c. Consolidation—which aims at the education and organization of the populace of an occupied area.

3. **THE DISTINCTION NOT ALWAYS EASY TO MAKE.** It is emphasized that the distinction made in paragraph 2 is completely valid only insofar as it affects the organization of operational units and teams. In many cases it would be highly artificial and inaccurate to make the same distinction with regard to the ideas and propaganda themes utilized. Frequently, a theme classified as “strategic” can be used with profit in a “tactical” situation. In like manner, “strategic” arguments enter into the program of “consolidation operations”.

a. To illustrate the above, you have in Figures 1 and 2 reproductions of the obverse and reverse of a leaflet which the Germans used against a British unit on the Anzio beachhead. It was "tactical" in the sense that it was intended to depress the morale of hard-pressed troops under heavy enemy fire. But it was only one angle of a long-range German propaganda campaign designed to exploit real or imagined prejudices and jealousies which divided British and Americans; in that sense, it was "strategic".

b. During World War II our strategic psychological warfare service used radio and leaflets to give wide dissemination in Germany, Italy, Japan and elsewhere to the texts of the Atlantic Charter and the various proclamations of Roosevelt and Churchill. The principles contained in those texts are the same ones used by our psychological warfare service in the re-education of the populations of occupied territory.

c. Thus, no hard-and-fast distinction can be made between "strategic" psychological warfare *as far as themes are concerned*. There are innumerable cases where "tactical" themes could *not* be used by the "strategic" units and many elements of a local nature enter into the "consolidation" aspect which are not "strategic"—but modifications of many "strategic" themes can be employed with profit by one or both of the other two services.

British Soldiers!

You are fighting and dying far away from your country while the Yanks are putting up their tents in Merry Old England. They've got lots of money and loads of time to chase after your women.



AI 037a 2-44

FIGURE 1



"You Americans are sooo different!"

FIGURE 2

Chapter 2

HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES

4. **DEFINITION.** Strategic psychological warfare means the wartime use of long-range propaganda to enemies and neutrals in support of military and political operations. Some of its themes and arguments are based on permanent political principles which remain the same through the centuries; others are less permanent and may have to be changed when a major political or military development modifies the situation in the world or in any large area thereof. But, the very term *strategic* indicates that the basic themes and arguments are generally applicable against enemies and neutrals everywhere and there is little likelihood of their having to be changed within a short period of time.

5. **ROLE IN TOTAL WAR.** Military and political strategists have come to think of the "shooting war" as being only the final phase of "total war".

It is preceded by a period of "cold war" in which every effort is made to attain the desired objectives by diplomatic negotiation and economic pressure. In connection with these, an elaborate psychological campaign is carried on by press and radio to convince the world of the right and justice of one's own position. Just as actual war is only the last step in a larger, overall political operation, so strategic psychological warfare is the continuation and prolongation in time of war of a propaganda campaign which was started long before during the years of peace.

6. AN ANCIENT ACTIVITY. Any discussion of psychological warfare must begin with the statement that there is nothing new about it. Since the dawn of history men have resorted to the same familiar techniques in order to induce in the mind of a rival or opponent an attitude or frame of mind favorable to their own purposes. If a potential customer can be persuaded that *he wants* the article you have for sale, your worries are over as far as he is concerned. By the same token, if an active enemy can be led to believe that his cause is unjust (and/or that his leaders are evil or incompetent and/or that you have an insuperable advantage in equipment and weapons) and that therefore *he hasn't a chance against you*, your struggle is already more than half won. History abounds in instances of successful psychological warfare: there is the story of Gideon vs Midianites in the Old Testament, the ruse of Ghengis Khan as his hordes swept over the vast area from the Danube to the Pacific Ocean.

7. MODERN APPLICATION. There is, then, nothing fundamentally new about the *principles* of psychological warfare. What *is* new is the improved techniques of the science of psychology, the systematic study by the experimental method of how men's minds work, the vastly expanded media for disseminating the spoken and written word to larger and larger audiences—and the forging of all these elements into a streamlined precision tool for influencing the thought of large masses of people.

8. GERMAN GENERAL STAFF CONCLUSIONS. In the years following 1918 the German General Staff set its best brains to work to discover why defeat had come to Germany despite the fact that ample and well-trained forces remained intact, and the internal economic condition of the country at that time was far from desperate. They came to the conclusion very quickly that defeat had been caused by a disintegration of national morale rather than by military disaster or economic collapse. According to their analysis, there are three stages in preparing a nation for modern war: *psychological* (to strengthen and toughen the morale of one's own people and undermine and weaken that of probable enemies and neutrals), *economic, military*, in that sequence and in that order of importance. They were convinced that the defeat of Germany in 1918 was to be explained by the failure to make adequate provision for the first stage.

9. GERMAN GENERAL STAFF PREPARATORY MEASURES. Accepting the accuracy of the above conclusions, the German General Staff approached the study of the problem with characteristic teutonic thoroughness. A vast network of schools and laboratories, staffed with their ablest psychologists and technicians, set about the task of determining how the psychological weapon could best be used to:

a. Induce the desired frame of mind in the population of the home country and

b. Frighten, convert, or confuse potential enemies or neutrals.

10. RESULTS OF GERMAN MILITARY RESEARCH. A study of the results and decisions of these German researchers affords us an excellent insight into the evolution of modern scientific propaganda as a part of political warfare, in time of peace as well as in time of war. It was they who handed to Josef Goebbels, when the Nazis came to power in 1933, this fearsome weapon of which he was to make such effective use in the following decade. It was by the study of their methods and techniques that Allied psychological warfare experts laid the foundation which enabled our people to overtake and surpass enemy propagandists in the course of World War II.

11. THE NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL "WEAPON". Applied psychology, coordinated with economic and diplomatic operations before the war and with military and political operations during the war, is one of the great new inventions of "total" war, it is an offensive weapon designed to destroy the morale of the enemy's civilian population and armed forces, and to lower enemy prestige in the eyes of neutrals. It knows no limitations in time or space; it is conducted before, during, and after the war against both the home and military fronts of the actual belligerents as well as in the territories of neutral nations.

12. SUCCESS WITHOUT SHOOTING. a. Recurring constantly in the writings of all German commentators on psychological warfare is the statement that the propaganda campaign must be started in peacetime, long before the outbreak of actual hostilities. If the campaign has been carried out effectively, many decisive successes will be scored without firing a shot. We all recall how Hitler occupied the Ruhr with no more than a show of teeth by playing on world sympathy for a "poor, divided Germany" and by arousing in British minds the old specter of French domination of the continent. We also remember how logical the Nazis made the "union" with Austria sound with the argument that a tiny, weak independent Austria—incapable of sustaining herself economically—was a senseless anachronism and that all Europe would be better off if she was a part of a German federation. And by 1938 the might of a rearmed Germany was such a nightmare to all the nations of Europe that Czechoslovakia was overrun simply by rattling the saber.

b. A more recent (and from our point of view, a happier) illustration of the part that strategic psychological warfare played in political warfare is the outcome of the Italian elections in mid-April, 1948. In the early winter of 1948 all signs pointed to the weakness of the DeGasperi government and the strong possibility of a sweeping victory by the Communists in the forthcoming elections. There followed swiftly a series of moves by the western powers designated to strengthen the hand of the DeGasperi government and encourage Italians to stand firm against the encroachments of communism. U. S. naval units moved into the Mediterranean. In the United Nations, Britain and the United States advocated the return of Trieste to Italy and supported Italy's candidacy as a member nation. Hints were dropped that the western powers would favor the eventual return to Italy of the Italian colonies. Radio and press stressed the fact that communism is a foreign-dominated international movement and reminded Italians of Italy's glorious role in the history of western civilization. The Italo-American "Friendship Train" brought to the doorstep of individual Italian families proof that their friends in America were thinking about them. Personal letters and radio messages assured numerous Italians that they were not forgotten by their former compatriots on this side of the Atlantic. The passage of the European recovery plan (ECA) made it certain that Italy would soon begin to receive the economic assistance necessary to regaining her prosperity. The Vatican spearheaded the propaganda campaign to remind Italians that Italy was the cradle of Christianity and laid stress on the anti-Christian nature of communist philosophy. The sum total of these moves offers a splendid example of skillfully executed political warfare and the result was a smashing victory for the anti-communist parties in the April elections. The strategic psychological warfare moves that may be discerned throughout the election and pre-election periods is the use of press and radio campaigns by the western powers both in Italy and throughout the world against the communist international movement (ably spearheaded and abetted by the Vatican), the extensive advertising of the movement of U. S. naval units in that area, the return of Trieste to Italy, the Italo-American Freedom Train, the intensive use of personal letters, radio messages, etc., by Americans of Italian descent and the advertising of the use of ECA which promised economic assistance. All this propaganda from a strategic psychological warfare viewpoint may be recognized for its true worth in assisting and abetting political warfare effort of the western powers.

13. BENEFITS AFTER WAR IS DECLARED. Beyond the successes scored by political warfare without any fighting, clever strategic psychological warfare should achieve additional and spectacular results soon after the start of actual hostilities. This can be done by continuing intensively with a wartime slant propaganda themes which have been persistently and continuously pounded home to the enemy in time of peace. We have a striking example of this in the unexpectedly rapid collapse of France in the summer of 1940. The morale of the French army and civilian popula-

tion had been so thoroughly eaten away by sustained waves of subtle propaganda that there remained no will to resist. The Nazi planners had carried out ably the instruction given by Hermann Foertsch of the German General Staff in 1935:

"To render an opponent defenseless means to rob him of his will to fight Everything that affects his will and his means to fight must be attacked, not only his military—but his moral, spiritual and economic forces—in short, his entire political power."

The French nation had been convinced that it had been deserted by the British, forgotten by the Americans, and betrayed by its own government. France was a beaten nation before the first German tank crossed the frontiers of the Lowlands. No one believes today that the France of 1940 could have held out indefinitely against the military power of Nazi Germany, but the most competent observers feel that a grim and determined France could have made the occupation of the country a much more prolonged and costly operation than what actually took place.

14. **THE ARMY'S ROLE.** Strategic psychological warfare is, then, the wartime continuation and application of propaganda which has been started in time of peace. But, our peacetime policy is controlled and directed by the Department of State and the propaganda employed to support it must necessarily be directed by the same agency. In time of war, a large part of the burden of strategic psychological warfare devolves naturally on the Army and Navy. For this reason, it is vital that in time of peace experienced key personnel of the Army and Navy be kept in close and constant contact with the policy-making and operations of our propaganda campaign. Conversely, in time of war it is necessary to have experienced representatives of the Department of State included in the formation of strategic psychological warfare policies. This cooperation with the Department of State in the formation of policies will be given more detailed consideration in Chapter 3, under OPERATIONS.

15. **KNOWLEDGE OF AREA ATTACKED.** An essential requirement of successful psychological warfare is that it be based on an accurate knowledge and full understanding of the intellectual, emotional and economic trends of the country against which it is directed. Religious prejudices, sociological problems and other factors differ widely from one area of the world to another. An argument or theme which might be highly effective with the population of one country could be completely ineffective (if not actually harmful with another people in another part of the world.

16. **MISTAKES IN THE PAST.** In the early days of modern psychological warfare frequent mistakes were made which stemmed from a tendency to believe that the emotional and intellectual reactions of all peoples to a given issue were the same: that issues which were very "live" in one country were equally important in another. With experience there

came the realization that a question which might be of vital interest in one area could be completely unimportant elsewhere. For example, the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru is a "hot" issue in those countries, but it is of no concern at all to the Chinese. To be effective, propaganda to any given nation must be in terms of things which affect its people deeply and not in terms of what is important to people in another part of the world.

17. **NEED FOR AREA SPECIALISTS.** Thus, successful psychological warfare requires not only specialists in the general science of human behavior, but also area specialists who can give to the generalities a form and expression which will make them appealing to (and not offensive to) the particular social or racial group for which they are intended. Each national, racial and religious group has its particular prejudices and taboos in the light of which a propaganda message must be carefully weighed. Even within a single country there are regional differences and sensibilities which have to be considered. For example, in our own country we might find that an argument on the civil rights question which might be received with approval in Wisconsin would arouse anger and protest in Alabama. The function of an enemy psychological warfare operator would be to exploit and intensify such latent dislikes and hatreds.

18. **FLEXIBLE POLICY.** Psychological warfare must not have a fixed, stationary policy, but must be highly fluid and flexible, adapted to changing developments and sensitive to national, racial, religious prejudices and differences. It must be prepared to change its "line" in accordance with shifting events in various parts of the world, and at the same time adhere to national policy statements and not be caught in transparent contradictions. This can be done by making statements as general as possible, but not rashly predicting the uncertain future, and by not making specific promises which we may not be able to keep.

19. **DON'T COMMIT YOURSELF.** One of the cardinal principles of psychological warfare is: "*Always* commit the enemy as widely and as fully as you can. *Never* commit yourself except for a specific purpose and then only when you are absolutely sure you can make good on your commitment." Unfulfilled promises and rash boasts from the enemy camp are bread and meat to the worker in psychological warfare. He pounces eagerly on any such lapse by a political or military leader on the other side and hurls it back by leaflet and radio with intent to convince the rank and file of the enemy that their leaders are not dependable and don't quite know what they are about. It is spectacular psychological warfare to forecast a brilliant achievement and then make it come to pass; it raises the morale of your own forces and depresses that of the enemy. But, if the forecast proves to be only an idle boast and the enemy tosses it back at you with a resounding "Oh, yeah?", the opposite effect is disastrous. Hence, the expert psychological warfare operator tries to commit the enemy as widely

and as deeply as possible, but he is extremely wary about committing his own side.

20. **DON'T CREATE NEW ISSUES.** Another basic rule of psychological warfare directed at the people of another country is that it should never create new issues and then try to convert the foreign nation to them. It should detect existing issues and concentrate on twisting and exploiting them. A weakness of German propaganda directed to Americans during the last war was its insistence on the anti-Semitic theme. It failed to realize that among Americans anti-Jewish feeling is neither very widespread nor very deep, and thus most of the effort along this "line" was wasted. But the German propaganda machine was on safer ground when it appealed to an actual anti-European prejudice among the Arabs of North Africa. And many an American did some serious thinking about the statement that the Russian ally on whose side he was fighting was actually a greater menace than the German enemy with whom he was exchanging bullets.

21. **IMPORTANCE OF PERSONALITIES.** More often than not it is preferable to direct psychological warfare at personalities rather than at issues. Emotional enthusiasm for (or hatred of) an individual is much easier to arouse than for an abstraction. His (or her) features can be ennobled or caricatured, the shape of the head distorted, some physical defect exaggerated in order to produce the kind of effect desired. We are familiar with the use made by political opponents of Chamberlain's umbrella, Hitler's mustache, Stalin's head. We saw how both Communists and anti-Communists in Italy adopted the likeness of Garibaldi's magnificent face to win votes for their respective causes. People come to love or detest a person much more readily than they do an idea.

22. **OBVIOUS SOURCE.** At the strategic level, it is usually desirable for the source of the propaganda to be evident. Experience has shown that a consistent, straightforward presentation of one's own viewpoints ("white propaganda") is more effective than the use of ruses, tricks and rumors whose origin appears to be different from what it really is ("black propaganda"). "Black propaganda" is highly delicate and risky. It should be practiced only by skilled experts and then only when the objective is of the most vital importance and it seems impossible to attain it by the "white" approach. In rare cases, it is better to have rumors spread by agents and "fifth columnists" in such fashion that they seem to have generated spontaneously within the country under propaganda attack. Your own radio can then pick them up and disseminate them as "news" from the enemy country. (This technique will be elaborated in Chapter 6, under **RADIO PROPAGANDA.**) This technique is extremely dangerous; exposure of your deceit means the loss of the confidence of your audience—and this confidence will be hard to recapture once it is lost. It is always

safer (and in the vast majority of cases just as effective) to stick to the truth, labelled for what it is and indicating clearly the sources from which it emanates.

23. DISSEMINATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. *a.* Psychological warfare is conveyed to the enemy by the use of printed matter, films, and by radio. Each of these methods are discussed below:

(1) *Printed Matter.* It is hardly necessary to dwell on the enormous role which the written word has had in influencing the history of human thought. Newspapers, leaflets, handbills, booklets and books have proven in the past to be the backbone of psychological warfare and they will continue to be a primary media despite the increasing and expanding importance of the radio.

(2) *Films.* This medium, with its graphic appeal to the eye, is more and more widely used as one of the most persuasive means of swaying human thinking. In the movie-conscious United States, we have daily evidence of the influence which this medium can exert. And it takes a wide-awake, discriminating and thoughtful mind to distinguish between truth and "hokum" in a motion picture. Following the invasion of Poland, the diabolically clever Nazi Propaganda Ministry arranged for films of those scenes of horror to be distributed as widely as possible in all countries which were to be eventual victims of German aggression. Foreign visitors of all categories were given special showings. We can readily believe that no small amount of the panic and paralysis caused in France by the German invasion in 1940 sprang from a visual memory of what had happened to Poland. For obvious reasons, this medium is of little use against the enemy in time of actual fighting. However, it can be of deadly effectiveness during the years of "cold war" which precede the period of military operations.

(3) *Radio a.* Students of mass psychology have reached the conclusion that the human mind is more affected by what it hears than by what it sees, that the appeal of a reasonable voice is greater than that of the most brilliant artistry or the most eloquent printed matter. German military psychologists made this observation early in the 1920's and subsequent laboratory research has confirmed their deductions. Thus, the radio has become the No. 1 medium for influencing public opinion and its influence will increase as technical improvements better its performance and expand the potential listening audiences. This primary medium is of such importance that the last chapter of this text will be devoted to the subject.

b. Psychological warfare themes may be conveyed forcibly by the three devices discussed below. These devices may be used in any or all of the mediums discussed in the preceding paragraph.

(1) *Slogans.* Single words or brief phrases which have an emotional content and convey to the hearer the suggestion of a whole idea. "Lebensraum" ("Living space") conveyed in a word Germany's expansionist




FIGURE 3

d. "Black" propaganda (see paragraph 22) is a highly delicate operation and must be carefully coordinated with secret intelligence. If it is not closely controlled, it may produce adverse or even dangerous results. Accordingly, such operations are best conducted from theater headquarters.

e. The intelligence requirements for psychological warfare go beyond the scope of ordinary military intelligence. Matters like the food situation on the enemy home front, rumors about scandals in the private lives of enemy political leaders, any sort of social unrest—all of these are part of the fabric of psychological warfare. When the usual intelligence agencies are asked to provide the ramified information needed for this work, the burden placed on these agencies is unduly heavy and distracts them from their specific duties. Insofar as the intelligence needs of psychological warfare can be met through normal army channels without placing on them an additional heavy burden, this method should be used. Usually, however, Psychological Warfare Division will have to provide its own channels for supplementary information.

36. ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION. Condition in a particular theater of operations will determine the organization of a psychological warfare division for that theater; it is impossible to define it in detail. In general, it can be said that the organization should be based on the duties of the said Division in that theater and should be functional in nature, i. e., groups and sub-divisions thereof should be established to perform duties incident to each of the operations indicated in paragraph 33. Figure 3 diagrams an organization which can easily be modified to adapt it to the special circumstances in any theater. When the headquarters is joint or combined (and it is probable that this will be true in many cases in future war), the Division will contain personnel from each of the services or allies represented in accordance with the type of staff which is established. The assignment of functions to the various sub-divisions of the Division are discussed in the following paragraphs:

a. *Plans and Policy Group.* As the same implies, this group is charged with the staff work to cover sections a, b, and c (5) of the responsibilities of the Psychological Warfare Division discussed in paragraph 34. It furnishes the necessary guidance for the Intelligence and Operations Groups, keeps their work in line with present and future operations in the theater, and sees to it that the work of the Division is coordinated within its own elements, with other kindred agencies operating in the theater, with political advisers and news agencies, and with the work being done in other theaters and in the ZI.

b. *Liaison Group.* The normal coordination between the Psychological Warfare Division and other divisions of the theater headquarters staff is conducted in routine manner, i. e., members of the Plans and Policy Group coordinate with G-3, members of the Intelligence Group with G-2,

(2) Programming and operation of fixed radio stations which are beamed at enemy or enemy-occupied territory.

(3) Preparation and mass-production of newspapers, periodicals, and "long-range" leaflets and arrangements with the Air Force for desired dissemination on carefully chosen targets.

(4) Establishment of a monitoring service to listen in on our own, allied and enemy broadcasts.

(5) Evaluation of the effectiveness of our own, allied and enemy psychological warfare and the development of new methods, techniques and devices to make our own work more effective.

(6) Preparation of requirements in personnel, supplies and equipment and the allocation of same to proper units and teams.

35. OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES. The principal fields in which the psychological Warfare Division will operate are as follows :

a. Operation in the radio field will always be necessary when coverage of distant areas can be provided from fixed stations which are taken over or set up in the theater. Policy coordination and assignment of missions for such operations must be under direct theater control. Extensive monitoring can also be provided better at the base of operations where technical equipment is available in larger quantities than elsewhere. All these factors make it advisable to have activity in the field of radio centered at theater headquarters.

b. In addition to the "long-range" strategic leaflets which are its special province, the Division will be called on to perform certain services for lower commands. To insure high quality of manufacture and uniformity of size (this last factor is vital when the material is being prepared for packing into leaflet shells or leaflet bombs), the quantity production of standard leaflets needed by tactical units can be effected better on the large static presses available at theater headquarters than on the small mobile presses with which the lower echelons are normally equipped. Accordingly, such leaflets as "fair treatment of prisoners", "safe-conduct passes", etc. which are used by all psychological warfare elements should be manufactured at theater headquarters.

c. Leaflet newspapers intended for enemy troops or civilians require a large editorial and publication staff, particularly when these papers are double-sheet, illustrated, and are to be produced in volume. Their dissemination is generally effected by strategic air units whose bases of operations are within delivery range of theater headquarters. All these requirements are met better as a theater project than when the activity is decentralized to lower units. This does not preclude the publication in special cases of small single or double-page leaflets by teams at army group, army or similar headquarters.

the Zone of the Interior (ZI) through the medium of short-wave radio. Some "timeless" printed matter can be produced in the ZI and shipped overseas, but the experience of World War II was that such material was usually too stale to be of much value. The great bulk of the printed matter must be prepared and produced in the theaters where there is the closest contact with latest developments. The greatest part of the most effective standard-wave radio programs must also be prepared overseas. In general, the ZI is too remote from the areas of operations to contribute more than high-level directives on political psychological warfare and the broader aspects of military psychocological warfare; these general principles can best be translated into radio scripts and leaflet texts in areas more closely in contact with the changing situations, i. e., in the theaters of operations.

33. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE A FUNCTION OF COMMAND. Responsibility for psychological warfare within a theater rests with the theater commander who must take into consideration the directives under which he operates, the special conditions in his theater and the nature of the military operations he is to conduct. To implement the psychological warfare activity, the theater commander will normally establish a special staff division and will assign to it the functions and duties pertaining to his responsibilities in this field. Since general conditions and the nature of the military operations to be conducted will vary from theater to theater, it is impossible to define precisely the functions and organization of the psychological warfare staff division for any particular theater headquarters. However, the fundamental functions and responsibilities of this staff division will be the same in all theaters and constitute a skeleton which can be modified to establish an organization suitable for any particular situation.

34. FUNCTIONS OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DIVISION. The basic functions and responsibilities of the Psychological Warfare Division are to:

a. Integrate psychological warfare with proposed theater operations and to execute such operations as may be directed by higher headquarters or requested by lower commands.

b. Coordinate all psychological warfare activities within the theater, relate them to similar activities in other theaters, establish close cooperation with the political advisers to the theater commander and with representatives of any national (or allied) information services which may be operating or planning to operate within the theater.

c. Plan and put into operation the different activities of psychological warfare, i. e.:

(1) Acquisition of necessary intelligence and the interchange of pertinent items with other interested agencies.

cy decisions about psychological warfare, but the role of the representatives of the armed services will become much larger and more active than in time of peace. They must guard against any political moves which might hamper or embarrass theater or field commanders. For example, it might be brilliant political propaganda to promise the civilian population of a certain area supplies and transport in return for cooperation with our advancing forces; however, if the field commanders are not in a position to furnish these services, the later widespread disillusionment and discontent over failure to keep the promises may outweigh the advantages gained by making them. The representatives of the armed services must keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff constantly informed of the latest trends in political propaganda in order that these may be fused with military psychological warfare directives sent out to theater commanders. The emphases at this level are necessarily quite different from those at theater level.

31. THE ARMY'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN PEACETIME. The Army's participation in the national propaganda campaign in time of peace is largely consultative and advisory. It must, however, make plans and preparations for assuming a more active role with the outbreak of hostilities. Under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the General Staff, Department of the Army has the following broad responsibilities for psychological warfare operations:

a. Providing planning and operational guidance for psychological warfare activities.

b. Providing Department of the Army liaison with joint agencies and with non-military agencies of the government.

c. Collecting, evaluating and interpreting sociological and psychological information, including an analysis of foreign propaganda affecting the military interests of the United States.

d. Providing psychological warfare units and bulk authorization in the organization of appropriate echelons of the Army and inclusion of suitable materials and supplies in logistical planning.

e. Providing for army training in psychological warfare and the development of new or improved weapons, instruments and techniques.

The allocation of functions affecting the above among the various divisions of the General Staff, United States Army, is found in appropriate Department of the Army memoranda. The Director of Plans and Operations, United States Army, has the responsibility for general supervision of army psychological warfare activities.

32. THE THEATERS OF OPERATIONS ARE THE CENTERS OF ACTIVITY. In time of war, the theaters of operations become the centers of strategic psychological warfare activity. Some part of it can originate in

The answers to the above questions vary widely. Some German experts have gone so far as to state that this weapon is to be considered as supplanting rather than implementing the military machine. This is an obvious exaggeration and is not to be taken seriously. Those enthusiasts who believe that propaganda alone can work miracles are hypnotized by their own words and dazzled by scattered initial successes. Dictators do not underestimate the importance of military, naval and air power, but they count on using psychological warfare to win many political battles before any "shooting war" starts. They know you can't win a war by psychology alone, but they also know that its use before and during wars will make them easier to win. Most American psychological warfare experts (and in this they concur with the British) content themselves with the statement that theirs is a valuable auxiliary weapon and *does* contribute to victory when coordinated with other arms,—when integrated with economic, diplomatic, and military warfare. As to its value in connection with military warfare, they point with pride to the statement of General of the Army Eisenhower:

"In this war, which was total in every sense of the word, we have seen a great many changes in military science. It seems to me that not the least of these was the development of psychological warfare as a specific and effective weapon. Without doubt, psychological warfare has proved its right to a place of honor in our military arsenal."

Chapter 3

OPERATIONS

29. PEACETIME POLICY CONTROL. In time of peace propaganda is employed in support of U. S. foreign policy and that policy is the responsibility of the Department of State. Thus, in the board or agency which directs pre-war propaganda, the influence of the Department of State must be predominant. In the said board or agency representatives of the various branches of national defense (Army, Navy, Air Force) are included. These representatives keep the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed up to date on the changing pattern of our peacetime propaganda and present to the cooperative board or agency appropriate views on items which affect the functions or responsibilities of the armed services. In this way, trained and experienced representatives of the armed services are fully cognizant of the background of our propaganda campaign and are able to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff in making plans for the day when the armed services will become the operational agencies for psychological warfare, i. e., with the outbreak of hostilities.

30. CHANGES NECESSARY IN TIME OF WAR. With the advent of war, the cooperative board will continue to be the source of high-level poli-

thought on a higher level. If one tries to reason with a person who has been thus impregnated, he will sooner or later withdraw into his fortress of collective thinking and will hide behind some emotional slogan. The mass delusion which gives him the feeling of greatness and superiority is dearer to him than all personal consciousness. The technique of such ideological regimentation is based on that of hypnosis. There are a few simple slogans. These are repeated, day-in and day-out, in every conceivable form. The radio, the press, posters in the streets, public advertising—all say the same thing. In times of mass emotion, people are especially defenseless against mass suggestion. Such a people is no longer composed of reasoning individuals; it follows the thought pattern in which it has been trained since childhood.

26. NEED FOR SKILLED AND CAREFUL PLANNING. Psychological warfare is one of the most delicate and explosive of weapons and can prove a dangerous boomerang if placed in the hands of inexperienced operators. In normal military operations we are accustomed to thinking in terms of evaluation of the objective, screening of the intelligence, detailed preparation of the operation and the assignment of specialists to each phase of the mission—but there is often found the deluded impression that *anyone* can execute psychological warfare. On the contrary, a psychological warfare "mission" is just as complicated and requires (if it is to succeed) the same amount of calculated preparation, detailed integration and skilled execution. To assign any phase of the task to an unqualified or inexperienced operator is to invite failure of the entire mission. In psychological warfare, the effect of such a failure is even worse than in other operations because a long series of successful missions is necessary to "live down" in the mind of the enemy the amusement or ridicule occasioned by one single mistake.

27. PRESTIGE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. The achievements of psychological warfare during the past war were such that its usefulness and value are much more generally appreciated in this country than they were a decade ago. We observed how close Josef Goebbels came to persuading the world of the myth of Nazi invincibility and the hopelessness of our trying to overtake the Germans in the race for supremacy in the air. Our own successful efforts in this field awakened our people to the immense possibilities of clever and skillfully executed propaganda.

28. ACTUAL EXTENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE'S CONTRIBUTION. We can admit that propaganda, efficiently applied long in advance of an actual state of war and continued through the period of active fighting, is a deadly weapon of total war. But *just how much* can really be claimed for it? To what extent can psychological warfare (joined with economic and diplomatic activities to form the combination we call "political warfare") be expected to supplant or replace armies and navies?

dreams. "The Mediterranean, an Italian lake," expressed Italian ambition to recreate the Roman Empire. "Asia for the Asiatics" won for the Japanese many friends in other parts of the Orient.

(2) *Symbols.* Signs or figures which carry to the eye the same effect that slogans do to the ear. These are one of the oldest and most powerful ways of influencing public opinion. We are all familiar with the use made of the swastika by the Germans, of the hammer-and-sickle by the Russians, and the "V" made famous by Winston Churchill. We also recall how reverse use was made by our enemies of caricatures of Uncle Sam ("Uncle Shylock") and grotesque distortions of the face of President Roosevelt.

(3) *Music.* "Music hath charms to soothe the savage breast" and the hypnotic power of a haunting rhythm accompanied by simple, easily-memorized words is enormous. We are all conscious of the emotional appeal of "AMERICA," "THE STAR SPANGLED BANNER" and the "BATTLE HYMN OF THE REPUBLIC." For Nazi Germans "DEUTSCH UBER ALLES" and the "HORST WESSEL SONG" had the same appeal and "GIOVINEZZA" (Youth) helped "sell" fascism to the Italians. Students of United States history recall how JOHN BROWN'S BODY LIES A-MOULDIN' IN THE GRAVE" helped inflame emotions during our own Civil War.

24. **PRINCIPLE OF REPETITION.** A guiding principle of which the psychological warfare operator must never lose sight is repetition, repetition, repetition. A small number of carefully selected simple themes is preferable to a large number of over-subtle or complicated messages. Some appeal to the emotions and others to the reason; of the two classes, the former is more effective with a large number of people. On these themes the propagandist hammers, pounds and insists with every medium at his command. The form is changed frequently, the idea is dressed up in new clothing, but the basic theme remains the same and the intended victim should see it and hear it again, again, and again until he finally comes to accept its truth.

25. **MASS HYPNOSIS.** In conducting psychological warfare against a nation which has been subjected to totalitarian regimentation, it is important to remember always that such a nation does not think along the same lines as does the population of a democratic country. Every inclination toward independent thought has been crushed through systematic training; in its stead there has been substituted automatic response to fixed stimuli. Mass delusions can be induced; if one isolates a people, allows no outside corrective, and pounds away daily with press, radio and films, with fear and pseudo-enthusiasm, any delusion can be instilled into that people and it comes to accept as natural the most primitive acts. Such delusions, so carefully implanted, are difficult to correct. Reasoning no longer has any value, for a mind mesmerized by the lower type of thinking is deaf to

etc. However, the very nature of psychological warfare makes the work so complex and the necessary relations with other agencies, service, etc., so ramified, that liaison is of the utmost importance. Furthermore, it is normally desirable to have division representatives make regular visits to subordinate commands to effect the necessary coordination and exercise such supervision as may be authorized. The Liaison Group may be a special section of the Division or it may be a part of the Plans and Policy Group. Either system is satisfactory and the choice will be determined by the composition of the theater headquarters and the nature and extent of the liaison tasks to be performed. It is always preferable that the officer (or officers) doing liaison work with a particular service have a reasonable competence in that service as well as in psychological warfare. For example, the officers doing liaison work with the Air Force should know enough about capabilities of the different type of aircraft, about the location and operations of the different air units in the theater to forestall any requests for air distribution which might be unreasonable or impossible of accomplishment. In like manner, the officers doing liaison work with the artillery should understand the problems and difficulties of those units to be able to advise the Plans and Operations Group accordingly; in short, they should be able to "talk the language" of the artillery service. Only the most general statements can be made about the organization of the Liaison Group. The particular conditions within the theater, the kinds of forces involved and the nature of the operations will govern the kinds of liaison to be performed, and these requirements will in turn govern the size and composition of the Liaison Group in the Psychological Warfare Division.

c. Intelligence Group. This group is responsible for gathering the intelligence necessary for psychological warfare purposes and for the processing and dissemination of such intelligence. Its work separates naturally into three stages:

- (1) Collection of materials.
- (2) Interpretation and evaluation of those materials.
- (3) Reports and records.

Appropriate sub-groups should be created to cover those functions. Their respective duties are as follows:

(1) *Collection Unit.* Acting on advice from the Plans and Policy Group on the basis of directives and requests from other headquarters, this unit will formulate the intelligence needs for psychological warfare needs in the theater. The required information will be obtained insofar as possible through normal military intelligence sources. To the extent that the required intelligence *cannot be* obtained through the usual sources, this unit will conduct interrogations of Prisoners of War (POW's) interviews, document research, etc. To this end, the personnel of this section must be in closest contact with the various G-2 divisions so as to know of the whereabouts of the enemy or other persons or materials which might re-

veal information useful in psychological warfare operations. The collection unit will also conduct surveys, polls, etc., to determine the effectiveness of our own, allied and enemy psychological warfare.

(2) *Analysis Unit.* This unit will take the information gathered by the collection unit, correlate same with information forthcoming from other sources and prepare the net result in a form suitable for use in psychological warfare. Its analysis should point toward two main objectives:

(a) An indication of the strong and weak points of the enemy's current morale, an evaluation of the effectiveness of our propaganda against him in the past and a prediction of how we can best attack him psychologically in the future.

(b) A study of the effect on our own forces of enemy psychological warfare with recommendations for advisable counter-propaganda measures.

(3) *Report Unit.* This unit puts into proper form and gives appropriate distribution to the reports compiled by the collection and analysis units. It also maintains up-to-date the files and records of the Intelligence Group so that the information contained therein can be made readily available to properly authorized agencies.

d. Operations Group. This group is the pulsating heart of the entire Division and it is on the efficiency and ability of the members of this group that the success of the Division's work hinges. It is subdivided into units of which each is charged with one or more of the media of psychological warfare employed in the theater. When there is need in the theater for any sort of specialized or technical training, the training unit organized to take care of this work will fall in the Operations Group. Coordinations of activities within the group is effected by the group chief and the heads of the various units. Specific duties of various units are as follows:

(1) *Radio Unit.* Under guidance of the Plans and Policy Group and on the basis of information furnished by the Intelligence Group, this unit prepares the scripts of programs and supervises broadcasting from all the fixed radio stations in the theater. Its technicians arrange for the installation of new stations and for the repair, activities and maintenance of captured stations. It coordinates the radio work being done by the mobile radio units attached to lower commands and transmits over the fixed stations such tactical scripts as may be requested by lower commands and approved by the Plans and Policy Group. It formulates the requirements in radio personnel and equipment for all radio activities in the theater and allocates frequencies, personnel and equipment to the various stations and mobile units. It establishes and maintains a general monitoring service of the activities of all enemy, neutral, and friendly radio stations within the range of reception.

(2) *Leaflet Unit.* With the possible exception of the radio and its powerful appeal to the ear, printed matter and its appeal to the eye consti-

tutes the most widespread (and consequently the most effective) medium of psychological warfare. Under the guidance of the Plans and Policy Group and on the basis of information furnished by the Intelligence Group, the Leaflet Unit prepares the strategic (or "long-range") leaflets designed to attack the enemy's morale in support of theater operations or national propaganda policy. This unit also produces the regular newspapers which are distributed on fixed schedules to enemy battle-front and home-front and which bring to the enemy's attention news that his own leaders would be likely to conceal from him or misinterpret to him. The unit receives from the ZI booklets, pamphlets, illustrated folders, etc., and in consultation with the Plans and Policy and Intelligence Groups decides on the proper distribution of this material. In some cases, this unit uses its technicians and facilities to execute for lower echelons tactical leaflets for the production of which the subordinate units do not have adequate facilities. Through the air liaison officer(s) and in consultation with the Plans and Policy and Intelligence Groups, the unit arranges for aircraft dissemination of the printed material over selected targets and in desired quantities. Needless to say, the unit keeps under constant scrutiny the reports of the analysis unit on enemy leaflet activity and its effect on our troops.

(3) *Training Unit.* Such a unit will be established if needed. It will supervise special training of psychological warfare personnel and will prepare and supervise orientation in psychological warfare to be given to military units coming into the theater. It will also arrange for suitable military orientation of civilian specialists who may be brought into the operation. It will also make recommendations concerning the basic training in psychological warfare which should be provided in training programs in the ZI.

e. *Administrative Group.* This group performs the normal administrative functions of the executive element in any staff division. It may have many other tasks, depending on the nature of the situation, e. g., whether the headquarters is combined or purely American; whether civilian personnel and supplies are employed by the Psychological Warfare Division; whether the theater is located in enemy, liberated-friendly, or allied territory; whether the various elements of the headquarters are close together or are widely scattered, etc. Under the most complicated circumstances, the division may be called on to perform clerical, communications, supply, personnel and transportation functions. Under the most favorable circumstances, the duties will be limited to office administration, with the remainder of the tasks being performed by other agencies of the headquarters. The sub-divisions listed below are those which may be needed under more unfavorable circumstances:

(1) *Executive Unit.* This unit plans the physical arrangement of the Division, establishes routines and procedures, maintains the Division's records and reproduces reports, communications and staff studies. It provides for the security of the Division, supervises the message center, re-

ceives and routes visitors and supervises the movement of the Division when the headquarters is moved.

(2) *Communications Unit.* This unit operates the Division message center. It also procures and allocates communications facilities for psychological warfare purposes, i. e., the transmission of directives, information and intelligence between the Division and neighboring higher and lower commands.

(3) *Personnel Unit.* This unit prepares the personnel requirements, arranges for the acquisition, transfer, promotion, reclassification and separation of personnel; to this end it maintains records on personnel not maintained by other agencies of the headquarters, especially those concerning civilian and allied personnel.

Chapter 4

LEAFLETS AND NEWSPAPERS

37. PROVISION OF PRINTING FACILITIES. Since printed and pictorial matter constitute one of the two most effective media of psychological warfare, a large proportion of the Division's energy goes into its production. When the Division is activated, one of the first steps to be taken by the Operations Group is to insure the availability of mass-production printing facilities. As headquarters will normally be in a large city where full-size newspapers were printed in time of peace, it can be presumed that suitable presses are already in existence. If the headquarters is located in Allied territory, proper contracts will be made with newspaper or publishing firms to place the needed facilities at the disposition of the Leaflet Unit. If the headquarters is located in captured enemy territory, these facilities will be requisitioned. The printing technicians of the Leaflet Unit will survey the local situation and make recommendations as to which of the existing printing installations are best suited to the needs of the Leaflet Unit. The question of inks, paper stocks and other materials which go into the printing operation is one for technical experts and need not be considered here.

38. IMPORTANCE OF THE APPEARANCE OF PRINTED MATTER. Only those experienced in the publishing business are fully aware of the stress which must be laid on the form, make-up and general appearance of printed matter. In the early days of our psychological warfare activity in North Africa, the available printing facilities were poor, the paper stocks limited and of low quality, and the inks and other supplies insufficient. The consequence of these conditions was leaflets whose appearance was not very attractive. Intelligence revealed that the Germans received these leaflets with a mixture of pity and contempt. Germany, the birthplace of

the printing press, had a tradition for good typography and fine craftsmanship which had become almost instinctive with all Germans and had penetrated down to the lowest levels of the population. When they received one of our poorly-executed efforts, their automatic reaction was that such an inferior piece of composition could not contain ideas of any great value. Although this feeling is especially strong with Germans, the same rule holds true to an extent with all recipients of leaflets. An excellent and telling script, conforming to policy and based on a shrewd evaluation of what will strike the mind of the enemy most forcibly, is only the first step in the process. If the leaflet is to have the desired effect, it must be appropriately illustrated by competent artists, set up in attractive form by skilled lay-out technicians, and prepared for the press by experienced typographers. Failure to meet the mechanical requirements can nullify a great part of the effort expended in arriving at the idea and the text.

39. PERSISTENT REITERATION OF THE SAME THEMES. For the writer of leaflets at the strategic level, the essential principle is repetition. (See paragraph 24). With tactical leaflets, there is constantly a new situation to be exploited—either as it happens or as quickly as possible thereafter—for the tactical situation may change suddenly and a message which would have been potent on Wednesday becomes useless (or even damaging) on Thursday. But in the strategic field only a major realignment of forces or a large-scale military or political upheaval causes a change in the propaganda “line”. By way of illustration let us examine our strategic psychological warfare in Italy during World War II. This can be broken down into three stages:

a. From the start of the war up to the invasion of the Italian mainland in September, 1943, our messages to the Italians were variations of the theme that we had no quarrel with the Italian people, that there was every reason why they should be our friends, that it was only the misguided ambition of Mussolini and his foolish alliance with Nazi Germany which made them the object of our attack.

b. With the fall of the Mussolini regime and the formation of the Badoglio government, our psychological warfare urged Italians to bring pressure on this government to sign a truce with the Allies and take Italy out of the war.

c. After the truce had been signed, our messages began to urge the Italians of northern Italy to support their government, to sabotage the barbaric German who continued to hold a part of Italy at the cannon's mouth, and asked why more Italian blood should be spilled to salvage what was left of Hitler's fading hope of world domination. Thus, there were only three basic stages in our strategic psychological warfare campaign against Italy during the entire war.

40. SAME BASIC THEMES IN CONSTANTLY CHANGING FORM. The basic themes must appear again and again in changed forms of presentation, must be frequently arrayed in new clothing. Each day's news, speeches by political leaders, parallels drawn from history,—in short, everything in the range of imagination of the script-writer will be a new trelis on which to drape the unchanging vine of the basic theme. When the same thought is suggested over and over again in a variety of new modes of expression it eventually comes to be accepted as fact. Figures 4 to 19 reproduces a few of the innumerable leaflets which carried to the Italians the underlying ideas of the three phases of our psychological warfare campaign against them. By pictures and printed words these themes were hammered into Italian minds—week after week and month after month—by millions of bits of paper which fluttered from the skies in every part of Italy. It was only after the Allies had occupied a good part of Italy that we were able to measure the extent to which this incessant drumfire of psychological warfare had crystallized in the minds of Italians these ideas toward which they were already vaguely predisposed.

41. EXPLOIT EXISTING ISSUES. It cannot be repeated too often that it is usually a mistake to try to create new issues, (see paragraph 20). The skilled operator very rarely attempts to make a new fissure in the armor of the enemy's morale; he selects with care weaknesses which already exist and insists upon them with artful suggestion and reminder. There are always some ideas which certain individuals or certain nations fear, detest, and avoid; the psychological warfare expert plays upon these like a skilled pianist, covering the basic theme with varied overtones but never leaving the basic theme altogether.

42. "TIMED" MISSIONS. There are occasions when the strategic psychological warfare service is assigned a "timed" mission to cover a momentary situation, but it is a situation which affects an entire theater or even more than one theater. By a very precise interpretation, one could insist that such a situation is "tactical" because it is momentary. This quibbling over terms is pedantic; the situation is also "strategic" *in extent* because it affects the operations of an entire theater or is of inter-theater concern. There follows an illustration of such a situation:

a. In January, 1944, it was discovered that the Germans were operating in Florence and Rome two elaborate training schools for Italian spies. These spies then infiltrated Allied lines and caused an immense amount of damage both in actual sabotage and in information carried back to the enemy. Names and details were secured from captured spies; Psychological warfare was instructed to "plaster" the areas in which these schools were located with leaflets showing our full information about the operations of these schools, and threatening with future retribution those "blacklisted" Italians who continued to do this work for the Germans. In-



"Our friends have arrived."

FIGURE 4

***“L'Italia si ricostruirà.
Sarà il popolo italiano a far
questo, scegliendo il proprio
governo secondo i principi
fondamentali della democra-
zia: libertà ed uguaglianza.”***

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

A terzo. la riproduzione di un cartellone che viene affisso nella Sicilia liberata

"Italy will rebuild itself. The Italian people themselves will do this by choosing their own government according to the fundamental principles of democracy: Freedom and Equality."

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

FIGURE 5



"Italy will act on her own."

FIGURE 6

ANNUNCIO

Questo è un messaggio rivolto al popolo italiano dal Presidente degli Stati Uniti d'America e dal Primo Ministro della Gran Bretagna.

In questo momento le Forze Armate associate degli Stati Uniti, della Gran Bretagna e del Canada, sotto il comando del Generale Eisenhower e del suo vice-comandante, Generale Alexander, stanno portando la guerra nel cuore del vostro paese. Questo è il risultato diretto della politica vergognosa che Mussolini e il regime fascista vi hanno imposto. Mussolini vi ha trascinato in questa guerra come nazione satellite di un distruttore brutale di popoli e di libertà.

Mussolini vi ha trascinato in una guerra che credeva fosse stata già vinta da Hitler. Nonostante la grande vulnerabilità dell'Italia agli attacchi dall'aria e dal mare, i vostri capi fascisti hanno inviato i vostri figli, le vostre navi e la vostra aviazione, su campi di battaglia molto lontani dalla vostra patria, solo per aiutare la Germania nel suo tentativo di conquistare l'Inghilterra, la Russia ed il mondo.

L'adesione dell'Italia ai piani della Germania nazista era indegna delle antiche tradizioni di libertà e di cultura del popolo italiano — tradizioni alle quali tanto devono i popoli dell'America e della Gran Bretagna.

I vostri soldati non hanno combattuto affatto per gli interessi d'Italia ma solo per quelli della Germania nazista. Essi hanno combattuto con coraggio, ma sono stati traditi e abbandonati dai Tedeschi sul fronte russo e su ogni campo di battaglia in Africa, da El Alamein a Capo Bon.

Oggi le speranze che nutriva la Germania di dominare il mondo sono state frantumate su tutti i fronti. I cieli d'Italia sono dominati dalle vaste flotte aeree degli Stati Uniti e della Gran Bretagna. Le coste d'Italia vengono minacciate dal più

ANNOUNCEMENT

This is a message directed to the Italian people by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

At this moment, the joint Armed Forces of the United States, Great Britain and Canada, under the command of General Eisenhower and his second-in-command, General Alexander, are carrying the war into the heart of your country. This is a direct result of the shameful policy which Mussolini and his fascist regime have imposed upon you. Mussolini has dragged you into this war as the satellite ally of a brutal ravisher of peoples and liberties.

Mussolini has dragged you into a war which he believed had already been won by Hitler. Notwithstanding the extreme vulnerability of Italy to attacks from the air and from the sea, your fascist leaders have sent your sons, your ships, and your air force away from your fatherland, solely to help Germany in her attempt to conquer England, Russia and the world.

Italy's adhesion to the plans of Nazi Germany was unworthy of the ancient traditions of liberty and culture of the Italian people—traditions to which the peoples of America and Great Britain owe so much.

Your soldiers have not fought for the interests of Italy at all, but only for those of Nazi Germany. They have fought courageously, but have been betrayed and deserted on the Russian front and on every battlefield in Africa, from El Alamein to Cape Bon.

Today, Germany's hopes of dominating the world have been disappointed on all fronts. The skies of Italy are controlled by the vast air fleets of the United States and Great Britain. The coasts of Italy are being assaulted by the greatest mass of naval forces that the Allies have ever concentrated in the Mediterranean.

*(The rest of the message warns that Italy's only hope of salvation lies in getting out of the war at once. It holds out the hope of a new, free Italy which will take her place in the respectable family of nations. It warns that the alternative is complete and utter destruction.)

FIGURE 7a



1. (on leaflet) "A Message from the Allies to the Italian People."
2. (on skirt which symbolizes Italy) "The Italy We Have Known and Loved."

FIGURE 8

Translation of Italian Leaflet I. J.

(Front)

**WHEN THE GERMAN AND FASCIST DOMINATION
OF ITALY SHALL HAVE COME TO AN END**

The President of the United States, when he received representatives of the Free American Press at the White House in Washington on the 11th June, 1943, announced the surrender of the garrison at Pantellaria after aerial bombardment carried out by Anglo-American aircraft. He added that this seemed to be an opportune occasion to address the Italian people through the press and the radio.

The President of the United States said that the Italians should remember that the present effects of the Anglo-American campaign against their country, were a perfectly logical and inevitable result of the policy pursued by Mussolini during recent years. Mussolini betrayed his own country by a military alliance with the Germans, dragging her into war in order to increase his personal power.

According to the President, such actions are not the actions of the Italian people. This series of irresponsible acts was carried out by the personal regime of Mussolini, the Fascist Regime, in the name of Italy, but without really representing the Italian people, which is in its majority a peace loving people. This contrast was clear in the Italian declaration of war which was made without provocation, an act which President Roosevelt had previously defined as « a stab in the back ».

Naturally, the President continued, the United Nations now have no other choice, except to pursue the war against Mussolini's Government and against Mussolini's armed forces, until final victory. It appeared, however, to Roosevelt to be honest, to declare, in the name of the United Nations, that they are in agreement upon one point: when the German domination of Italy has come to an end, and when the Fascist Regime has been swept away, the Italian people can be sure that it will enjoy the liberty to choose any form of non-Fascist, or non-Nazi Government, which she may prefer. Naturally the United Nations cannot do anything about this until Fascism has been destroyed and the Germans have abandoned Italian territory.

The United Nations, in Roosevelt's words, certainly intend — and hope — that Italy shall be re-made as a Nation, taking back once more, her place as a member of the European family of Nations. He concluded by saying that when the Germans have been driven out of Italy and Fascism has been abolished, then and only then, the good judgement, the supreme good judgement of the Italian people itself, will be clearly revealed.

Translation of Italian Leaflet I.B.

(FRONT)

WARNING !

After the fall of Tunis the Germans will make Italy a battle-field, Germany's Southern Front.

The conquest of Tunisia leaves the Allied Air Forces free to attack military objectives in Italy.

This means that all the plants, arsenals, ports, railways, bridges and roads of Italy must expect attack from the air by day and night.

Those who continue to live near military objectives run the risk of losing their lives or of being injured.

For this you must thank Mussolini and his master Hitler.

Remind yourselves of Mussolini's speech of the 18th November 1940 : « I have asked and obtained from the Fuehrer a direct participation in the air war against Great Britain... »

NOW, IT IS ITALY'S TURN !

WHY DIE FOR HITLER ?

(Back)

WHY DIE FOR HITLER ?

Italian soldier, you have no interest in fighting this war.

Like you, millions of Italian men, women and children, that is the whole of Italy, stand to lose everything if this war continues.

This is Hitler's war.

No one provoked Italy; no one assaulted Italy; no one declared war on Italy.

Hitler is making Italy his shield against the overwhelming superiority of the United Nations, a superiority which is admitted by even the Axis Communiques.

For the Italians this means death, ruin and desolation.

Yesterday, Hitler sacrificed the Italians of Africa. Today he sacrifices the Italians of Italy.

GERMANY WILL FIGHT TO THE LAST... ITALIAN !

Italian soldier, no one asked you if you wanted to fight.

But they have sent you to die. They have told you :

« BELIEVE, FIGHT, OBEY »

WHY ? FOR WHOM ? FOR HOW LONG ?

FIGURE 10

(Front)

Translation of Italian Leaflet I. MM.

**WE HAVE LANDED TO LIBERATE
YOU FROM THE GERMANS**

The Allied armies have crossed the Messina Straits to the Italian mainland. They come as liberators not as conquerors.

We were able to liberate Sicily so quickly because Italians on the island not only welcomed us but helped us as allies to drive out the common enemy, the Germans. They sabotaged German lines of communication, they gave us valuable information about military movements and helped us in a thousand other ways. All of these things you can do now that our troops have landed on the mainland.


The Germans want to transform Italy into a battlefield by fighting a rearguard action through your country, leaving only scorched earth behind them as they retreat towards the Brenner Pass. They are indifferent to what happens to Italy, so long as they can postpone a little longer the day when Germany will be occupied by our troops.

We know that you want the war to end quickly for Italy so that your country will be spared further destruction. We know, too, that so far it has been impossible for you to end the war because of the German troops in your country. But now that we have already landed in the South, and, owing to our command of the sea, are also strong enough to land large forces at any other point in Italy, you need not fear the German forces.

You can help save Italy from further destruction! You can hasten the end of the war for Italy! Follow the directions given on the other side of this page, and the Germans will be driven quickly from Italy, and you will be free.

WE ARE HERE BECAUSE THE GERMANS ARE IN ITALY

FIGURE 11



"Italian soldiers!"

FIGURE 12

"Why do you endure this?"

Translation of Italian Leaflet No. I. PP.

(Front)

THE MOMENT TO FIGHT

Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt have addressed the following appeal to Marshal Badoglio and the Italian people :

« In this hour of agony for your country, fate has called upon you to take the first steps towards winning peace and liberty, and to act so that Italy shall take the honourable place which awaits her in the concert of the nations. Fascism has collapsed, and the important task is now to free Italian soil from the oppressor.

« Hitler, making use of his accomplice Mussolini, has brought Italy to the verge of ruin, in disastrous campaigns in Egypt and in Russia. On the field of battle the Germans have always deserted their Italian allies, making use of them to cover the rear in their precipitous retreats.

« Hitler is now threatening to subjugate the Italian people to the infamous Nazi regime. The moment has now come for every Italian to fight at the side of the liberating nations. They have powerful forces and the arms of liberation are coming to your aid.

« The Nazi terror will not last long, and by helping us you will place yourselves once again at the side of those friends from whom you were deceitfully separated.

« Do not miss any opportunity to strike hard and surely at the Germans. Have faith in your future, march together with your American and British friends to win again peace, justice and liberty ».

Winston Churchill. Franklin D. Roosevelt.

FIGURE 13

Translation of Italian Leaflet I. E. E.
POST CARD




FIGURE 14

Your Excellency,

Today Italy's destiny is in your hands.

In a moment of such gravity, it is more than ever your duty to respect the will of your people.

After four years of Nazi-Fascist war, the Italian people address themselves to you, who freed Italy from Fascism, asking that you put an end to our sorrow and our suffering.

THE ITALIAN PEOPLE WANT PEACE

Several million of these postcards were airdropped to the Italians. They were accompanied by messages urging that the Italian people demand that Italy make peace and suggesting that the postcards be mailed in mass quantities to Marshal Pietro Badoglio.

FIGURE 15

Translation of Italian Leaflet I.SS

YOUR KING SPEAKS

ITALIANS,

For the supreme welfare of the country, which has always been my first thought and the aim of my life, and in order to avoid greater suffering and greater sacrifices, I authorised the request for an armistice.

For the safety of the capital and in order fully to fulfil my duties as a king, I, together with the government and the high military authorities, moved to another part of the free and sacred national soil.

Italians,

I have absolute faith in you whatever may happen, as you may count even to the supreme sacrifice on your king.

May God help Italy in this grave hour of her history.

VICTOR EMMANUAL.

September 1943.

YOUR GOVERNMENT ORDERS

IT IS THEREFORE OUR DUTY TO FIGHT BY THE SIDE OF THE ANGLO-AMERICANS AGAINST THE GERMANS, and a few crazy Italians, no longer worthy of the name, who have placed themselves under their orders. We must fight them by every means, everywhere and at all times.

REMEMBER that in every German you must see an enemy, and that at all times and everywhere you must treat him as such.

REMEMBER that to allow oneself to be disarmed is a crime and a crime which you and your families will pay for with long years of slavery.

REMEMBER that resolute men, under good leadership and full of determination, can resist forces much superior to themselves.

REMEMBER that when people and troops form a single block of hearts and weapons, a single front and a single force, they are invincible.

REMEMBER that, against stronger forces, our troops and population have the terrible weapon of guerrilla warfare; take to the woods, cut communications, blow up bridges and stores, destroy isolated men and material. And above all do not give up, do not lose heart, stand firm. Today, keep this well in mind, **RESISTANCE MEANS SURVIVAL.**

BADOGGIO.

SABOTAGE

THE GERMAN

When the Germans retreat before our forces, they will try to loot, burn, steal and destroy, as they have done everywhere in southern Italy. Prevent them by every means in your power.

See to it that the Germans obtain no supplies of food or any other kind from this region. Preserve your water supply.

Impede German communications in the vital areas. See that the electrical lines, the tunnels, the railroads, the bridges that are useful to the Germans are put out of commission.

Watch the Germans. Stop their mad lust for destruction.

Protect your lives.

Aid Italy in the fight for liberation.

Keep the Germans from destroying.

Remember Naples.

FIGURE 17




FIGURE 18

REMEMBER THIS!

As the Germans are compelled to retreat they will indiscriminately sow mines. They will plant them in roads, in fields, in houses, and in likely and unlikely places.

These mines constitute a danger for you and your children and an obstacle to the advancing troops of liberation. and an obstacle to the advancing troops of liberation.

For your own protection and in order to hasten the day of liberation note carefully and mark in your memory or write down the position, nature and size of the mines which the Germans have planted in your neighbourhood.

Try to discover particularly what buildings have been mined.

At the approach of our forces, do all in your power to communicate this information to them.

By doing this you will remove danger from yourselves and your families, you will hasten the advance of our troops—your troops—you will save your homes from destruction, you will hasten the day of liberation.

Our engineers can quickly neutralise these mines when they know their location, and if possible their size and kind.

Observe carefully!

Remember accurately!

Inform us quickly!

formation secured after our occupation of the Rome-Florence area proved conclusively that this series of leaflets had caused widespread consternation and demoralization among the Italian clientele of the spy schools. The potential spies fled and hid in the country despite energetic efforts by the German dictators to prevent them from doing so. (This was proved by German documents captured later.) The work of the schools disintegrated. Figures 20 and 21 are the obverse and reverse of one of these leaflets. Figures 20a and 21a are the translations of Figures 20 and 21 respectively.

43. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE MUST BE "TAILORED" TO FIT THE CLIENT. In paragraph 39 you were given an analysis of our campaign of strategic psychological warfare against the Italians in World War II. It cannot be restated too often that a pattern of psychological warfare which works successfully against one nation will not necessarily have any effect on another. In fact, an approach which is highly successful in one part of the world may be worthless (or even actually harmful) in another. Two illustrations follow:

a. In the campaign against the Japanese, psychological warfare teams had to avoid ridiculing the person of the Emperor of Japan; he was considered as a divinity by the masses of the people, and attempts to belittle him could only increase the hatred and contempt for the "barbaric" westerners on the part of the Japanese. In the same way, it was taboo to urge the Japanese to "surrender" because this notion carried with it the concept of disgrace and "loss of face" and a Japanese who surrendered could never hope to return home and be accepted by family and friends; the code of *bushido* demanded that he die rather than surrender. But he could "cease resistance with honor," the capture was something beyond and outside his own will; there was no disgrace involved—and the result was the same as far as we were concerned.

b. During the summer of 1945, an intensive effort was made to get the Chinese elements in North China who were fighting with the Japanese to turn against the invaders and to join their fellow-Chinese in sabotage and guerilla warfare. Many leaflet appeals were made to them on a patriotic basis, citing the careers of national heroes and urging the "puppet" troops to emulate the high courage and loyalty to homeland of their forefathers. Figures 22 and 22a give a leaflet in Chinese based on KUAN TI and the English translation of the message respectively.

c. Thus the psychological warfare campaign against any given population *must* be carried out by people permeated with the history, culture and reactional patterns of the nation under attack, by people who have lived in the foreign country for years and who understand the thinking processes of its nationals.

AL S.I.D.

Servizio Informazioni Difesa

Abbiamo seguito il vostro non facile e movimentato lavoro con vero interesse. Ma ora il tempo stringe. La guerra s'avvicina. Non sarebbe meglio, ad esempio, tagliarsi i baffi e fare le valigie, dott. Vittorio Foschini, invece di perdere ore preziose al Ristorante "Bolognese" in Piazza del Popolo, mentre la "1100" marrone targata M. D. N. n. 296, che potrebbe essere tanto utile al servizio, sosta lungamente con grande noia del povero autista travestito in borghese? Non sarebbe meglio ritirarsi a casa, in via G. B. De Rossi n. 29, lontano dagli occhi indiscreti che vi seguono dovunque? Che succede nel vostro appartamento dalle 13.45 alle 14.30, mentre voi ve ne state al Ristorante o mentre vi attardate oltre l'orario nell'Ufficio di via XX Settembre? E non vi pare, Capitano Pier Francesco Nistri, che sarebbe ora di far bagaglio sia dalla casa di via delle Tre Madonne n. 12, sia dal SEGRETISSIMO Ufficio di Informazioni distaccato presso le S. S.? Non sarebbe ora di accomiatarvi dagli amici dell'Excelsior? Non vi punge nostalgia del campanile di S. Croce sull'Arno? Non vi commuove il ricordo di Angelo e Pescini Clelia che vi videro nascere nel fatale Marzo 1909?

E voi, aviatore di scrivania, Capitano Di Groppello, cosa aspettate a riprendere un po' di allenamento al volo? Potrebbe esservi utile.

E voi tutti, S. I. D. e non S. I. D., Ten. Giannuzzi, Colonnello Nardi, Maggiore Stern, Maggiore Del Filo e gli altri DI CUI NON CI SFUGGE IL NOME, sappiate che la vostra attività di spie e traditori è seguita, minuziosamente seguita, segnata nei suoi particolari. La punizione vi raggiungerà.

TO THE S I D

(Service of Defense Information)

We have followed with keen interest your difficult and intensely active work. But now time is getting critical. The war is coming close to your door. Would it not be better, for instance, Dr. Vittorio Foschini, to cut your mustache and pack your baggage instead of wasting precious hours at the Bolognese Restaurant in the People's Square while the Fiat "1100" with the maroon license tag no. MDN 296 stands idle in the street when it could be so useful to the service? Wouldn't it be better to withdraw within your home at no. 29 G.B. De Rossi Street, far from the prying eyes which follow you everywhere you go? What is taking place in your apartment between 13:45 and 14:30 while you are away at the Restaurant or stay beyond schedule at the Office in XX September Street?

And you, Captain Pier Francesco Nistri, don't you think the time is ripe for you to decamp both from the house at no. 12 in the Street of the Three Madonnas and from the VERY SECRET Office of Information which is working with the SS? Wouldn't this be the right time to break off with your friends of the Excelsior Hotel? Don't you get homesick for the village bell-tower of Santa Crece sull'Arno? Aren't you moved by the names of Angelo and Pescini Celia who watched you being born in that fatal month of March, 1909?

And you, swivel-chair aviator, Captain Di Gropello, what do you expect to get out of all this:- a little flight-poisoning? Well, that might be the best thing for you.

And all of you - S I D and not S I D - Lieutenant Giannuzzi, Colonel Nardi, Major Stern, Major Del Filo and the others WHOSE NAMES ARE KNOWN TO US, know that your activities as spies and traitors are being followed - closely followed - and recorded in all details. YOU WILL BE PUNISHED.

(The above message, giving intimate details of the private lives of Italian spies working with the Germans in Rome, frightened many active collaborators of the nazis. Similar messages were dropped on all North Italian cities where the Germans had active spy centers. Figure 21 gives the reverse of the leaflet which holds out a hope of escaping punishment if the individuals named cease spy activity at once.)

FIGURE 20a

Vi conosciamo uno per uno

Voi che non siete i capi, voi che siete strumenti dei veri traditori.

Domani non potrete giustificarvi dicendo: « Ho obbedito agli ordini dei superiori. »

Ognuno è responsabile dei propri atti.

Non c'è delitto che una vera buona azione non possa far dimenticare.

Ognuno può riscattarsi.

Ognuno può condannarsi.

SCEGLIETE

WE KNOW
YOU
INDIVIDUALLY

YOU, WHO ARE NOT THE CHIEFS, YOU WHO ARE INSTRUMENTS OF THE
REAL TRAITORS.

TOMORROW YOU WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO SAY: "I ONLY OBEYED
THE ORDERS OF MY SUPERIORS."

EACH MAN IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS OWN ACTS.

THERE IS NO CRIME WHICH SINCERE GOOD CONDUCT CANNOT CAUSE
TO BE FORGOTTEN.

EACH MAN CAN REDEEM HIMSELF.
EACH MAN CAN DAMN HIMSELF

CHOOSE

FIGURE 21a

替日本打仗的中國士兵們， 像關公一樣回到自己弟兄這邊來吧！

人人都知道關公是英雄。人人都知道關公對弟兄和人民的忠義。因此，幾百年來，他一直讓人民像神一樣的崇拜着。他已經成了忠義的代表了。

他也曾經落在敵人手裏過，可是他終於回到他的弟兄這邊，又同着他們爲正義和人民戰鬥了。

替日本打仗的中國士兵們，現在和日本作戰，想把中國從日本壓迫下解放出來的中國軍隊和盟國軍隊，都是你們的弟兄，你們也要像關公一般，回到你們弟兄這邊來吧！

誰也有良心，誰也願意受人崇敬，不受痛恨。只要能對人民盡忠義，誰也能成英雄。如果真正爲人民戰鬥，爲人民犧牲，縱然是無名小卒，也會受人崇敬。

俗話說：『成神成鬼，全靠自己』。

不論自願或不自願，你們在敵人那邊已經很久了。日本就要垮台了，你們現在已經站在十字路口。你們必須選擇通到你們人民的路，這條路也能叫你們得到光榮。不然，你們就只好在毀滅的路子上打滾了。

在華美軍
C. P. H.

CHINESE TROOPS IN THE SERVICE OF THE JAPANESE-RETURN TO YOUR BROTHERS AS DID KUAN TI.

Everybody knows that Kuan Ti was a hero. Everybody knows that he was loyal to his brothers and his people. Because of this he has been worshipped as a god for hundreds of years. He has become a symbol of loyalty and justice.

For a time, you recall, he fell into the hands of his enemies, but he came back to fight for justice and the good of his people.

Chinese soldiers fighting for the Japanese-the Chinese and the Allies who are fighting to liberate China from Japanese oppression are your brothers. Return to your brothers as did Kuan Ti.

Each of us has a conscience. Each of us wishes to be honored and not hated. Each of us can become a hero if he practices justice and loyalty towards his people. Should he fight and die for his people, he will be honored even though he is unknown.

The proverb says: "To be a god or a ~~deity~~ depends entirely upon which one you yourself are aiming at". Willingly or unwillingly you have been with the enemy for a long time. The Japanese are on the verge of collapse and you, soldiers, stand at the crossroad as Kuan Ti stood many centuries ago. You must choose the road that leads back to your people and to glory, or you will stumble onto the way leading to destruction.

FIGURE 22a

44. VALUE OF ILLUSTRATED LEAFLETS. The experience of World War II was that the illustrated leaflet usually "carried more punch" than one consisting of text alone. Sometimes a striking picture with a very simple caption was more effective than any quantity of words. The famous drawing of the "boot" of Italy kicking out a Mussolini garbed in Nazi uniform (Figure 6) was one of the most spectacular single items in the psychological warfare campaign against the Italians. When Allied troops arrived in the peninsula, they found copies of this leaflet pasted or tacked on houses, barns—everywhere. The picture told a simple story in a direct fashion which appealed to a peculiarly Italian sense of humor. It is certain that a similar effort directed against a Japanese leader would, under parallel circumstances, have provoked more anger than laughter and would have failed completely to get the desired effect. Figure 23 shows the obverse of a picture leaflet used in connection with stage 3 (see paragraph 39c) of the psychological warfare campaign in Italy. The use of the same picture against the Germans would have been inadvisable at that time, since most of them would not have accepted then the idea of a grotesque "red-handed" Hitler.

45. LEAFLETS FOR ILLITERATE POPULATIONS. When dealing with a primitive or illiterate populations, it is necessary to depend almost entirely on the pictorial device to convey the messages. During the Assam (Burma) campaign, energetic efforts were made to enlist the cooperation of the native hill people in the struggle against the Japanese. So few of these people could read that printed messages were valueless; in this operation the artists rather than the writers were the purveyors of psychological warfare. It was also found that these people were highly susceptible to presents, even of the simplest kind. So, small packages containing needles-and-thread, salt, vegetable seed, etc., were scattered by plane over the villages in the path of the projected Allied advance. These packages were marked so as to indicate the source of origin: red-white-and-blue, American flags, markings of the Air Force, etc. The seed packages turned out to have additional significance at a later date. Combat officers reported that when these areas were occupied by American troops they found the natives tending plots of vegetables which had grown from seeds dropped by American planes. In order to insure the necessary native labor and keep the population contented, the Allied forces had to do something about the famine conditions in the region; these almost mature vegetables reduced the size of the burden on Allied Military Government.

46. "WAR AIMS" LEAFLETS. Another use of leaflets made in the last war was to disseminate widely among the populations of enemy and enemy-occupied territories the significant pronouncements of Allied political or military leaders which stated the objectives of the Allies and their plans for the post-war world, decisions of Big Three conferences, etc. These were usually reproductions in print of the scripts which were broadcast over the radio; on one side of the leaflet appeared the actual text of



"OUT WITH THE GERMANS!"

FIGURE 23

— 49 —

The reverse bears the words: "We drove them from Sicily; now, let's drive them from Italy."

the declaration (or excerpts of the most significant passages if the entire text was too long) and on the other side commentary on the salient items in the declaration. For example, the text of the Atlantic Charter was disseminated in millions of leaflets in all languages in all parts of the world which could not be reached by normal news services. Figures 24 and 25 give the obverse and reverse of one of the many leaflets which made the provision of the Atlantic Charter known to the people of German-occupied Italy. Figures 24a and 25a give the translations of the leaflet.

47. CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. Until evidence to the contrary was produced, sceptics argued that a message like the one described in the foregoing paragraph would be dismissed with a shrug by the enemy and would have no effect on his thinking. "More propaganda!". This contention would probably have been true of any one isolated message, if it had not been a part of a long-term, overall psychological warfare campaign. But the effect of psychological warfare is cumulative. As the enemy's situation became more difficult and as he had occasion to see that our pledges and promises in other respects had been fulfilled, repeated statements of our intentions gradually came to have the desired progressive effect on his mind. Our psychological warfare effort had two objectives:

- a. To establish the reliability of promises made by our leaders.
- b. To show the unreliability of promises made to the enemy by his own leaders.

Figures 26 and 27 give the obverse and reverse of a leaflet intended for German troops everywhere and designed to show them that Hitler and his intimates sought safety from bombing in the remote Berchtesgaden retreat, but denied this shelter to refugees from bombed-out metropolitan areas back home. Similar leaflets pointed out to the Germans each instance of broken promises or bad faith of which any Nazi leader was guilty. When this is done over a long period of time, the enemy leaders finally become discredited in the minds of their own people. It should not be forgotten that a clever enemy will make effective use of any careless statements made by our own leaders. The Nazis made excellent capital of a pre-war speech of President Roosevelt in which he made the careless statement that not one American boy would be called upon to shed his blood or lay down his life on foreign soil. They deluged our troops with leaflets showing caricatures of President Roosevelt, the caption "I PROMISE YOU!", and figures (their own, of course) on our recent casualties. The American soldier, who was dodging bullets and wallowing in mud at the time, could not fail to be affected by a series of such reminders.

48. THE BEST PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IS ALWAYS TRUE. A cardinal principle of psychological warfare is that falsehood does not pay. When one is dealing with the same audience over a long period of time, it is vital to establish the reputation for telling the truth always. This is

CARTA DELL' ATLANTICO

Il Presidente degli Stati Uniti d'America ed il Primo Ministro Winston Churchill, rappresentante il governo di Sua Maestà del Regno Unito, dopo essersi riuniti, considerano che è opportuno rendere noti alcuni principii comuni alla politica nazionale dei loro rispettivi paesi, principii sui quali essi basano la loro speranza di un avvenire migliore per il mondo.

1. I loro rispettivi paesi non mirano ad ingrandirsi, sia in ciò che riguarda i loro territori sia in qualsiasi altro modo.
 2. Essi non desiderano vedere nessuna modifica territoriale che non sia conforme ai desideri, liberamente espressi, dei popoli interessati.
 3. Essi rispettano il diritto di tutti i popoli a scegliersi la forma di governo sotto la quale vogliono vivere ; essi desiderano vedere restituire i diritti sovrani e l'autonomia a quei popoli che ne sono stati privati colla violenza.
 4. Essi si sforzeranno, pur rispettando i trattati preesistenti, di facilitare su un piede di eguaglianza l'accesso di tutti gli Stati, grandi e piccoli, vincitori o vinti, al commercio ed alle materie prime del mondo, necessari alla loro prosperità economica.
 5. Essi desiderano raggiungere la piu solida collaborazione fra tutte le nazioni nel campo economico, allo scopo di assicurare per tutti un miglioramento delle condizioni di lavoro e di sicurezza sociale, ed allo scopo di facilitare l'adattamento di tutti i paesi all'evoluzione economica.
 6. Dopo la distruzione definitiva della tirannide nazista, essi sperano vedere lo stabilirsi di una pace che offrirà a tutte le nazioni i mezzi per vivere in sicurezza nell'interno delle proprie frontiere, una pace che darà a tutti gli uomini di tutti i paesi la garanzia di vivere una vita normale, liberata dalla paura e dalla miseria.
 7. Una tale pace deve permettere a tutti gli uomini di attraversare senza ostacoli i mari e gli oceani.
 8. Essi ritengono che tutte le nazioni del mondo, tanto per ragioni morali quanto per ragioni pratiche, debbono pervenire alla rinuncia dell'impiego della forza.
- In considerazione quindi che nessuna pace futura potrà essere mantenuta se gli armamenti terrestri, navali ed aerei continuassero ad essere utilizzati dalle nazioni che minacciano o potrebbero minacciare di fare aggressioni oltre le proprie frontiere, essi credono che, in attesa dello stabilirsi di un sistema permanente di sicurezza generale, il disarmo di queste nazioni è essenziale. Essi aiuteranno ed incoraggeranno egualmente tutte le altre misure pratiche suscettibili di ridurre il peso schiacciante degli armamenti per i popoli che amano la pace.

ATLANTIC CHARTER

The President of the United States of America and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, representing the Government of His Majesty of the United Kingdom, having gathered together in conference believe that it is opportune to make public certain principles common to the national policy of their respective countries, principles upon which they base their hope of a better future for the world.

1. Their respective countries aim at no self-aggrandizement, either with respect to territory or in any other way.
2. They want to see no territorial change which does not conform to the freely expressed desires of the peoples concerned.
3. They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they wish to live; they desire to see restored the sovereign rights and self-determination to those peoples who have been deprived of them by violence.
4. They will strive, while respecting pre-existing treaties, to make accessible on a footing of equality to all nations of the world, large and small, conquerors and conquered, commerce and raw materials of the world necessary to their economic prosperity.
5. They desire to arrive at the closest collaboration among all nations in the economic field, with the intent to assure to all an improvement in working conditions and social security and with the intent to make easier the adaptation of all nations to economic evolution.
6. After the complete destruction of the nazi tyranny, they hope to see the establishment of a peace that will give all nations the means of living in security within the confines of their own frontiers, a peace which will give all men of all countries the guarantee of living a normal life, free from fear and misery.
7. Such a peace must allow all men to cross the seas and oceans without hindrance.
8. They contend that all nations of the world, for moral as well as for practical reasons, must come to renouncing the use of force.

Considering then, that no future peace can be maintained if land, naval and air armaments were to be continued to be used by the nations which threaten or might threaten to make encroachments beyond their own borders, they believe that in the attempt to stabilize a permanent system of general security, the disarmament of those nations is essential. They will assist and encourage all practical measures likely to reduce the crushing burden of armaments for the peoples who love peace.

FIGURE 24a

ITALIANI !

Voi potete leggere e riflettere sulla **CARTA ATLANTICA** che noi abbiamo riprodotto sul retro di questo manifestino. I vostri capi vi hanno sempre nascosto questo documento. Essi hanno avuto paura di pubblicarlo.

PERCHE ?

Le ragioni di questo silenzio fascista sono chiare.

La CARTA ATLANTICA dimostra :

I) Che le Nazioni Unite non desiderano ingrandirsi a spese dell'Italia e delle altre Nazioni. Mussolini dichiaro la guerra all'Inghilterra e all'America. Ma noi non nutriamo nessun odio contro il popolo italiano e noi non vogliamo vendicarci sul suo dorso.

La CARTA ATLANTICA dimostra :

II) Che quando le Nazioni Unite avranno liberato l'Italia e gli altri paesi oppressi, esse daranno sia a voi che alle altre nazioni la possibilità di accesso, sulle stesse basi di parità, al commercio ed alle materie prime della terra, che sono necessari alla prosperita economica. Voi otterrete queste **MATERIE PRIME** come gli altri popoli.

La CARTA ATLANTICA dimostra :

III) Che le Nazioni Unite vogliono restaurare i diritti sovrani e un libero governo del popolo italiano, egualmente agli altri popoli. Noi provvederemo affinche il popolo italiano, come gli altri popoli oppressi dell'Europa, possa scegliere il proprio governo che rappresentera realmente gl'interessi del popolo italiano.

La CARTA ATLANTICA dimostra :

IV) Che le Nazioni Unite sono decise a restaurare il commercio internazionale, in modo che voi, come gli altri popoli oppressi dell'Europa possiate beneficiare di migliorate condizioni di lavoro e di una progressiva sicurezza **ECONOMICA E SOCIALE**.

Voi non voleste questa guerra. **VOI NON FOSTE INTERPELLATI QUANDO MUSSOLINI DICHIARO LA GUERRA**. Voi non avete potuto impedirlo. **MA OGGI AVETE LA POSSIBILITA DI PORTARE LA PACE ALL'ITALIA**.

Volete continuare a soffrire per la Germania di **HITLER** che vi ha condotti al disastro ?

Se tale è la vostra volontà voi sarete le vittime della guerra totale che noi siamo decisi a portare contro tutti i regimi fascisti e nazisti.

O VOLETE LA PACE ?

Voi potete ottenere la pace.

Nè **HITLER** nè Mussolini possono mantenere **L'ITALIA IN GUERRA** se **IL POPOLO ITALIANO ESIGE LA PACE**.

VOI DOVETE SCEGLIERE

ITALIANS:

You can read and reflect on the ATLANTIC CHARTER which we have reproduced on the reverse of this leaflet. Your leaders have always concealed this document from you. They are afraid to make it public.

WHY?

The reasons for this fascist silence are clear.

The ATLANTIC CHARTER reveals:

1) That the United Nations have no desire to expand their territory at the expense of Italy or of other nations. Mussolini declared war on England and America; but we hold no grudge against the Italian people nor do we want to take any revenge on them.

The ATLANTIC CHARTER reveals:

2) That when the United Nations have liberated Italy and the other oppressed countries they will give you, as well as other countries, the possibility of access, on a basis of equality to the commerce and raw materials of the earth which are necessary for economic prosperity. You will have access to these RAW MATERIALS on the same bases as other nations.

The ATLANTIC CHARTER reveals:

3) That the United Nations want to restore sovereign rights and a free government to the Italian people, as well as to other peoples. We will make provision for the Italian people, like other oppressed peoples of Europe, to be able to choose its own government which will really represent the interests of the Italian people.

The ATLANTIC CHARTER reveals:

4) That the United Nations have decided to revive international commerce, so that you, like the other oppressed peoples of Europe can benefit by improved working conditions and by a progressive ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL security.

You did not want this war. YOU WERE NOT CONSULTED WHEN MUSSOLINI DECLARED WAR. You could not prevent it. BUT TODAY WHO HAS IT IN YOUR POWER TO BRING PEACE TO ITALY.

Do you want to continue to suffer for Hitler's Germany which has brought you to the brink of ruin?

If such is your wish, you will be the victims of the total war which we are resolved to wage against all fascist and nazi regimes.


OR DO YOU WANT PEACE?

You can have peace.

Neither HITLER nor MUSSOLINI can keep Italy in the war if THE ITALIAN PEOPLE DEMANDS PEACE.

YOU MUST MAKE THE CHOICE.

FIGURE 25a



"All regions in the environs of Berchtesgaden are closed to refugees from the districts damaged by bombs."

The Reichsmisier for Special Housing
1 August 1943

FIGURE 26

(Back)

FROM THE HOMELAND

A Swiss paper, the **ST. GALLER TAGBLATT**, writes :

« London has become a soft prelude — to Hamburg, Cologne and Wuppertal. If the front would run diagonally through Western Germany, the destruction could not be more dreadful. Descriptions of Swiss citizens returning from the erased cities show that the remarks of a survivor of Stalingrad that Hamburg looks worse than Stalingrad is hardly exaggerated. New and positively unthinkable is one aspect which is being mentioned in all these reports : Not only gas, electricity and nutrition services cease to function but the Government machine and the police — the German government machine and the German police. There were no longer any harbor authorities to control the ships which still could leave Hamburg harbor; thousands of foreign workers, according to the Danish radio, started to leave for home without even consulting the officials in charge and lynchings were committed not only against looters : there many accounts to be settled when the police cannot maintain public order. Perhaps Hamburg is but a prelude ».

A German paper, the **KELNISCHE ZEITUNG**, writes :

« Homelessness of hundreds of thousands, is it not a very fertile source for all symptoms of general decay ? The annihilation of property creates that great equality which drives whole regions towards bolshevism without any effort. Mass feeding, housing in barracks and mass transports are signs of the hour... A great migration is under way in Germany ».

And how do the migrants feel ?

A Swede who has taken refuge in Sweden after a long stay in Germany reports in a Swedish newspaper, the « **GOETEBORGS POSTEN** » :

« I travelled in a car with many homeless refugees from bombed districts. Among them was a boy, ten years of age, pale and lean who was looking out of the window. Talking to him I learned that in three weeks he hadn't slept more than three nights. His mother had been evacuated to Eastern Prussia, his brother and sister somewhere else, perhaps to Bavaria.

The face of the boy was expressionless, and with the same quiet stubbornness with which he told his story he said : *I wish I could shoot Hitler to death.* This is the atmosphere in the bombed regions — and not only there ».

Mass migration, misery, destruction, homelessness — that's how it looks today in Germany. And one city after the other is in for it. That is the homeland which you desire to defend ?

Are you really defending it ? Does it do any good to your homeland that you are fighting here in foreign lands where you are uninvited guests, where they wish you to the devil. Don't you just contribute to the progressing destruction at home ?

While you are fighting here far away from the homeland, the homeland behind you goes to pieces. Don't wait too long, or you won't find anything left at home.

**YOU FIGHT TO WIN TIME
TIME FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF GERMANY**

FIGURE 27

known as "building up credibility". It is especially essential when one is dealing with an audience predisposed to want to disbelieve every statement you make. The individual member of your audience cannot check on all your statements; in fact, he personally can check on very few of them. It is highly important that he discover over a period of time that all things you told him on which he *could* check turned out to be absolutely accurate. After a while he comes to believe you in spite of himself, to read with interest everything you have to say, *and to accept as equally true those things on which he cannot check.* One untruth, misstatement, or foolish assertion can destroy the patient work of weeks or months; it can also furnish the enemy counterpropagandist with valuable ammunition with which to wreck your "reputation for credibility" with his own people.

49. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF TRUTH. The good psychological warfare operator tells the truth consistently. But there is a tremendous field for his work within the framework of the truth. The skill lies in three things:

- a. *What truths are told.*
- b. *How much of the truth is told.*
- c. *What coloring is given to the truth presented.*

People often ask: "Is it true or is it just propaganda?" This question is not pertinent. The question to ask is: "Why did the source elect to print (or put on the air) that particular piece of news and give it that particular emphasis?" Those who *collect* the facts also *select* the items which they pass on to their audience: what is the motive or bias behind this selection? Unless some other motive is obvious, it can be presumed that the selection was designed to affect the minds or emotions of a given group of people for a given purpose. Naturally, the selection of facts to be presented—and the manner in which they will be presented—must be carried out by specialists who are thoroughly familiar with the emotional reactions and thinking processes of the audience for which the messages are intended. A specialist who might be very effective for the Chinese might be of no value at all in psychological warfare directed to the Arabs of the Middle East.

50. IMPORTANCE OF NEWSPAPERS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 48 and 49, newspapers addressed to the populations of enemy and enemy-occupied territory are one of the most important vehicles of printed propaganda. A dispassionate and apparently impartial presentation of the facts is in most instances more convincing (for week-in, week-out consumption) than emotional tirades or denunciations of the evil intentions of the enemy's leaders. These "vest-pocket" airborne newspapers are of immense value in any area. They are of special value in areas which are without other news sources, or in those where the population has ceased to believe the statements of the official sources of news.

51. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE NEWSPAPERS IN CHINA. The vast hinterland of China was "sealed off" by the Japanese from contact with the outside world for a period of eight years; most of the Chinese looked with suspicion on the news given them by the Japs. At war's end we found that the people of these areas had devoured hungrily the contents of newsheets dropped to them by American planes, scanty as these drops were. Because of the immense areas to be covered and the limited resources available, it was impossible to achieve the volume and regularity of coverage so important in newspaper operations. Despite these handicaps, our psychological warfare service kept a trickle of news flowing to a news-starved population. Figures 28 and 29 give the obverse of two copies of the weekly news-leaflet air-dropped to Japanese-occupied areas of China during the summer of 1945. Figures 28a and 29a give the translations.

52. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE NEWSPAPERS IN EUROPE. In France, Jugoslavia, and other German-occupied areas of Europe, airborne newspapers could be and were delivered on regular schedules and in sufficient volume to reach a large percentage of the public. The news contained in these pages was a powerful factor in giving encouragement to and keeping alive hope in underground allies. Without it, they might have been reduced to inactivity by the conditions of suppression and discouragement under which they lived and worked. Nor was the territory of Germany itself neglected. Vast masses of newspapers were air-dropped on regular schedules over all the chief German cities. While it cannot be claimed that they were believed with the same readiness that they were in other European countries, post-war information proved that they were widely read and their contents compared with that of German newspapers. Their very presence probably forced the German News Agency to print news items which it would otherwise have doubtless withheld from the German public.

53. NEWSPAPERS FOR TROOPS IN BATTLE AREAS. Enemy troops in the battle zones, cut off from most sources of news, are vulnerable targets for the "newspaper weapon". Because of the more elaborate facilities for production and distribution, it is usually better to have these produced by the "strategic" team at theater headquarters. But this activity should be carried out in closest cooperation with the tactical teams. The editors who prepare these newspapers should spend frequent periods of time with the tactical units. They should engage in frequent interrogations of freshly-captured prisoners. In short, they should take every step to keep abreast of the current thinking of the enemy troops on the front for which this particular newspaper is intended. The selection and emphasis on news items for battle-front troops is a problem quite different from that of editing for home-front civilian population or for dissident elements in territory overrun by the enemy. Figures 30 and 30a show the obverse and translation of the weekly newsheet dropped on German troops in the closing weeks of 1943.

緊要新聞

第七一七
日由一九
十一年九
六月廿二
號編社報
國社報日

三巨頭會議已在波茨坦舉行





杜魯門總統，邱吉爾首相和史達林大元帥

會議於七月十七日正式開始，會議地點是柏林西南十七哩的波茨坦的德皇故宮。

杜魯門帶同外長，軍事首長和大批的顧問參加。

牠的重要性質，恐怕比下幾項：(一)太平洋戰爭。(二)德國的將來。(三)戰後歐洲的新疆界。(四)歐洲受戰爭摧毀地區的復興。換一句話說，三巨頭會議是一個和會的預備會，牠的決定將為正式和平會議的底子。美

英蘇三國的成功，而舊金山會議的圓滿結束，以及最近三國對於波蘭新政府成立的協議，也是這會議成功的預兆。

杜魯門總統 熱烈歡迎。杜氏看到也會煩赫一時的柏林的殘破景象，慨嘆地說：「這是很可怕的，但這是德國自作之孽。」

在史達林大元帥動身到柏林去之前，負有重要使命於六月卅日抵蘇的宋子文院長於七月十三日深夜與史氏作第六次(即末次)之會談，歷時一小時多。會談之後，中蘇兩方發表公報，謂兩國商討雙方權益有關的問題，表現高度的協調。

以前任何國際會議都大。這會議的舉行，不單是為着解決有關歐洲的問題，而且是為着解決亞洲問題。

★這一傳單提醒你們：美機隨時會到你們那兒來。

中蘇會談告暫結

次之會談，歷時一小時多。會談之後，中蘇兩方發表公報，謂兩國商討雙方權益有關的問題，表現高度的協調。

FIGURE 28

BIG THREE MEETING IN POTSDAM

The Truman-Churchill-Stalin meeting officially began on July 17th, in the former palace of the Kaisers at Potsdam, 17 miles southwest of Berlin. Their retinues consisted of foreign ministers, military chiefs and advisers. The meeting place itself is symbolic of the common victory the Big Three have won and the common task they are to shoulder.

The conference is believed to be a long one and is likely to be even more important than any in the past. It is for the purpose of settling pressing problems not only in Europe but in Asia. The major problems to be discussed will include (1) the Pacific War, (2) the future of Germany, (3) new borders of postwar Europe, and (4) rehabilitation of the war-torn areas. In a word, the meeting of the Big Three will be a preliminary peace conference which will set the pattern for a full-dress peace. The solidarity among the three great powers guarantees the success of this historic meeting and the successful conclusion of the San Francisco Conference and the recent agreement regarding the formation of a new and united Polish government have already augured well for it.

In Berlin President Truman was welcomed very heartily by both the Russian and British authorities. Surveying the ruin of once powerful Berlin, he remarked: "This is terrible, but they brought it upon themselves."

SOONG, STALIN CONFERRED SIXTH TIME

Before Generalissimo Stalin left for Berlin, the Chinese Premier T. V. Soong, who arrived at Moscow on June 30 for an important mission, conferred with him for the sixth and last time on July 13, at midnight. This meeting lasted more than one hour. After the meeting, Soong went to see the U. S. Ambassador Harriman. It was reported that all the Soong-Stalin talks were carried on in an atmosphere of war cordiality.

緊要新聞

第十號
美國報社編
自一九四五年九月五日



菲島戰事勝利結束

日軍共被殲四十二萬人

麥克阿瑟將軍總部於七月五日發出公報稱：「菲律賓全部今已解放，菲島戰事可視為結束」。

去年十月二十日，麥克阿瑟將軍(圖為麥氏肖像)所部在雷伊泰島登陸成功，菲島戰事便開始。經過二百五十日的戰鬥，獲得非游擊隊積極協助的美軍，終於把數達四十五萬的日軍的有組織抵抗粉碎，把包含大小七千多個島嶼的菲律賓羣島完全解放。在整個戰役中，日軍損失四十二萬人，而美陸軍的傷亡和失踪僅有五萬四千。三萬的日軍殘部，散佈各處，只能作零星的抵抗。

婆羅洲 澳軍協助

板八里巴

澳軍藉美海空軍的協助，在婆羅洲東岸的產油港巴里八板登陸。這是盟軍在婆羅洲大規模登陸的第三次。第一次於五月一日

在塔拉甘登陸，第二次於十四日後在婆羅乃灣登陸。在登陸之前，美機和美艦一連十五天把巴里八板猛烈轟炸。日軍雖已準備盟軍有此一着，但澳軍進展仍速。他們已佔了兩個機場和巴里八板港。巴里八板是遠東精煉煤油的最重要生產中心之一，在太平洋戰爭以前，年產煤油一千五百萬桶。像澳軍已佔領的塔拉甘，塞里亞和米里的油田那樣，巴里八板製煉的煤油對於盟軍作戰有很大的幫助。

宋子文在莫斯科 會晤史太林

中國行政院長宋子文偕隨員十五人於六月三十日抵莫斯科。自一九四〇年立法院長孫科訪蘇以來，這是中國

FIGURE 29

PHILIPPINES CAMPAIGN VICTORIOUSLY CLOSED

A communique issued at General MacArthur's headquarters on July 5 said: "THE ENTIRE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ARE NOW LIBERATED AND THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN CAN BE REGARDED AS VIRTUALLY CLOSED."

This campaign started last October 20th when General MacArthur landed his amphibious forces on Leyte Island. After 250 days of fierce fighting, all the organized resistance of the Japanese troops, totalling 450,000 has been smashed and the entire archipelago, comprising of Luzon, Mindanao and 7,000 other large and small islands, liberated.

The Japanese lost about 420,000 troops in the battle of the Philippines while the U. S. Army suffered only 54,000 in killed, wounded and missing. The remaining 30,000 Japs are widely scattered and from now on can offer only sporadic resistance (Illustrated with a photo of General MacArthur).

ASSIES CAPTURE BALIKPAPAN ON BORNEO

On July 1, the Australians, supported by U. S. naval and air forces, landed on Balikpapan, an oil-producing center and seaport on the east coast of Borneo. This is the third of major Allied landings on Borneo. The first was made on Tarakan May 1, and the second on Brunei Bay forty days later.

Prior to the landing, Balikpapan was subjected to fierce American naval and aerial bombardment continued for 15 days. Despite that the Japs were well prepared for this invasion, the Aussies made rapid advances. They have captured two airfields and the central area of Balikpapan. Balikpapan is one of the most important production centers for refined oil in the Far East. Its annual output reached 15,000,000 barrels before the Pacific War. Like the oil of Tarakan, Seria and Miri fields, the petroleum refined at Balikpapan will help Allies in the drive against the common enemy.

(Illustration with a map of Borneo)

T. V. SOONG CONFERRING WITH STALIN IN MOSCOW

The Chinese Premier, T. V. Soong arrived in Moscow June 30, accompanied by a 15 men delegation. This marked the first of a Moscow visit by a Chinese leader since 1940, when Sun Fo, President of Legislative Yuan, was there. Soong's party was accorded highest honors by the Soviet leaders. He conferred with Generalissimo Stalin twice and had an interview with President Kalinin. On his arrival in Soviet capital, Soong stated: "I express my unswerving confidence that friendly collaboration between China and Russia will be an immense contribution to the task of establishing unshakable and general peace."

A couple of days after Soong's arrival, Prime Minister of Outer Mongolia, Cheibalsan, came to Moscow, too. His presence may have connection with Soong-Stalin talks which are believed to cover virtually every issue of the Chinese-Russian policy.

FIGURE 29a

FRONTPOST

NR. 6. WOCHENBLATT FÜR DEUTSCHE SOLDATEN 8. DEZEMBER 1943.

Roosevelt, Churchill und Stalin treffen sich in Persien

Der türkische Außenminister war zugegen

Die drei führenden Staatsmänner der Vereinten Nationen trafen sich in Teheran, der Hauptstadt Persiens. Nach ihrer Zusammenkunft, die vier Tage dauerte, veröffentlichten sie am 1. Dezember eine gemeinsame Erklärung, in der unter anderem folgendes gesagt wird:

«Wir haben volle Übereinstimmung erzielt über Ausmass und zeitliche Planung der Operationen, die von Osten, Westen und Süden erfolgen werden.»

Nach dem Kriege werden wir mit allen Ländern, ob gross oder klein, tatkräftig zusammenarbeiten, deren Völker sich so wie unsere Völker mit Leib und Seele der Aufgabe geweiht haben, Tyrannei zu stürzen und Unzulässigkeit, Unterdrückung und Unduldsamkeit aus der Welt zu schaffen.»

«Keine Macht der Erde kann

uns hindern, die deutschen Armeen zu Lande und die deutschen U-Boote auf dem Meer zu vernichten und die deutschen Rüstungsstädte aus der Luft zu zerstören.»

An den Besprechungen in Teheran nahm auch der türkische Außenminister M. Meneuozoglu teil. Nach ihrer Abreise aus Teheran kehrten Roosevelt und Churchill nach Kairo zu einer Besprechung mit dem türkischen Präsidenten İnönü zurück.

8500 Tonnen auf Berlin in vier Stunden

Das britische Luftfahrtministerium gibt bekannt, dass während der letzten fünf schweren Luftangriffe auf Berlin insgesamt 8500 Tonnen Bomben abgeworfen wurden. Die Gesamtdauer dieser Angriffe betrug weniger als vier Stunden. Aber die gesamte Bombenlast war grösser als die, welche die deutsche Luftwaffe während der Jahre 1940 und 41 auf London geworfen hatte.

Jeder dieser Luftangriffe konzentrierte sich auf einen besonderen Industriebezirk von Berlin. Von dem jüngsten Angriff, auf Charlottenburg, kehrten 41 Bomber der R.A.F. nicht zurück.

In der Nacht vom 3. zum 4. Dezember warfen schwere Bomber der R.A.F. 1500 Tonnen Bomben auf Ziele in Leipzig. Von diesem Angriff kehrten 29 Bomber der R.A.F. nicht zurück.

„DIE HILFE GOTTES“

Der «Osservatore Romano», das amtliche Blatt des Vatikans, verurteilt den Beschluss der Deutschen, alle Juden in Italien zu internieren und ihr Vermögen zu beschlagnahmen.

«Diese deutschen Massnahmen», schreibt die Zeitung, «werden Tausende von Kindern, Frauen, Kranken und Alten schwer treffen. Um die Hilfe Gottes zu verdienen ist es notwendig, Nächstenliebe gegenüber Allen zu üben.»

SÜDFRONT

ALLIIERTER VORMARSCH AN BEIDEN FRONTABSCHNITTEN

Hauptquartier der 15. Armeegruppe

8. Dezember 1943.

An der adriatischen Küste rückte die VIII. Armee in der vergangenen Woche 15 km. vor, und nahm Lanciano und Fossacesia ein, wo zahlreiche feindliche Geschütze erbeutet wurden. Mehr als 1000 Gefangene wurden gemacht. Ein Bataillon der 65. deutschen Infanteriedivision wurde

von einem Oberfeldwebel kommandiert.

Nach sechstägigen heftigen Kämpfen hat die V. Armee die Deutschen aus ihren stark befestigten Bergstellungen westlich von Mignano geworfen und steht jetzt auf den Höhen, die das Knie des Garigliano beherrschen. Viele Gefangene wurden eingebracht.

FRONTPOST

No. 6 WEEKLY PAPER FOR GERMAN SOLDIERS, DECEMBER 8th., 1943

Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin meet in Persia

Turkish Foreign Minister also present

The three leading statesmen of the United Nations have met at Teheran, capital of Persia. After the conference, which lasted four days, they issued on December 1st. a joint statement, from which the following are excerpts:

• We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of operations which will be undertaken in the east, west and south.

• (After the war) we will seek the co-operation and active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery and oppression and intolerance.

• No power on earth can pre-

vent us from destroying the German armies by land, their U-Boats by sea and their war plants from the air.

The Turkish Foreign Minister, M. Memencioğlu, was also at the Teheran conference. After leaving Teheran, Roosevelt and Churchill returned to Cairo for a conference with the Turkish President Inönü.

" TO MERIT GOD'S AID, "

The German decision to intern all Jews in Italy and to confiscate their property has been condemned by the " Osservatore Romano ", official newspaper of the Vatican. " The new German measures ", stated the newspaper in a leading article, will strike thousands of children, women, aged and sick, who are children of God. We are forced to point out that to merit God's aid it is necessary to practise charity towards all. "

8500 Tons on Berlin in four Hours

The British Air Ministry reports that in the last five heavy air attacks on Berlin altogether 8,500 tons of bombs were dropped. The combined duration of these attacks was less than four hours. Yet the total bomb-load was greater than that dropped by the German Luftwaffe on London in the whole year 1940-41.

In each of these raids a different industrial area of Berlin was selected for concentrated bombardment. In the latest raid, on Charlottenburg, 41 bombers of the R.A.F. did not return.

On the night of December 3rd-4th, heavy bombers of the R.A.F. dropped 1,500 tons of bombs on targets in Leipzig. 29 bombers of the R.A.F. did not return.

SOUTHERN FRONT

ALLIES ADVANCE ON BOTH SECTORS

18th. Army Group Headquarters

December 8th., 1943.

On the Adriatic coast the 8th. Army has advanced 15 kilometres in the past week and has taken Lunciano and Fossacesia, where much enemy artillery was captured. More than a thousand prisoners have been taken. A battalion of the German 65th Infantry Divi-

sion was commanded by a sergeant major.

After six days of hard fighting the 5th Army has expelled the Germans from strongly fortified positions in the mountains west of Mignano, and now overlooks the bend of the Garigliano river. Many prisoners have been taken.

FIGURE 30a

54. RECEPTION OF NEWSPAPERS BY GERMAN TROOPS. German troops in both Italy and northern Europe found the attractively prepared Allied newspapers more stimulating than the stiff, cold communiques of the German Army. In the closing years of the war, as the Nazi position deteriorated, we stepped up the tempo of our "newspaper attack". Larger and more elaborate sheets were prepared and distributed on twice-a-week and thrice-a-week schedules. Reliable information from behind the German lines indicated that they sensed that Allied newspapers were giving them more reliable information than their own news sources. Interrogation of prisoners brought out some amusing sidelights on the interest taken by German soldiers in our printed material. Many prisoners complained of irregularities of delivery: a whole week had passed without a newspaper (this was because of bad flying weather which had kept our planes on the ground): an issue of March 19th had been received before the issue of March 15th (due to a confusion in loading at the airfield), etc. Other prisoners offered suggestions for a more efficient delivery: make the delivery at dawn when the soldiers were up but most of the officers were still asleep, so that the soldiers could pick up, read and conceal the papers with less danger of being caught by their officers: try to make the drops in flat, open country so that enemy soldiers could get them easily, etc. One prisoner complained that Allied artillerymen had fused some leaflet shells poorly, they had buried themselves in the mud, and he and his companions had to dig them out and open them to "get the latest news".

55. DESIRABLE IN NEWSPAPER WORK. In psychological warfare newspaper work, one should try to attain the three following objectives:

a. It should appear regularly. Newspaper-reading is a habit and a single issue will not have any appreciable effect. But, once one has gotten accustomed to the make-up and presentation of a given paper, one feels slightly "lost" when one has to change over to another.

b. It should be delivered on schedule. If one is in the habit of reading a certain publication (daily, weekly, monthly) on a fixed schedule, one has a feeling of irritation when that schedule is interrupted by snow-storms, train strike, or other acts of God.

c. It should be produced in sufficient quantities to insure full coverage. Mass effect is the object. The greater the number of people reached, the greater will be the impact of the effort. It is important that there be sufficient volume to reach the entire potential audience.

56. DANGER OF BOOMERANGS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. Extreme caution must be exercised in the composition of all leaflet messages and news items; each one must be examined carefully from all angles with possible future repercussions in mind. A particular item might be highly successful in a given place at a given moment, yet its use would be inadvisable if it could rebound later with harmful results which would out-

weigh the momentary advantage gained. A psychological warfare operator who becomes so intent on his immediate target that he loses sight of the broader implications of his messages is a menace; he should be given little freedom of action. For example, bomb warnings intended to depress the morale of enemy populations may arouse sentimental indignation in certain circles back home. They may also be used by the enemy to show neutrals the cold-blooded, "uncivilized" nature of your warmaking or to whip his own people into a white-hot fighting frenzy. There are always many perfectly true facts which would make excellent psychological warfare in one area, but which could be picked up and used with such telling effect against you elsewhere that it is much better to let them go unmentioned.

57. **EXPERIENCE THE ONLY SURE GUIDE.** All possibilities must be considered before a new leaflet theme or "news line" is launched. No hard and fast set of rules can be laid down to govern wise decisions in matters of this sort. Wide experience, resulting in an almost automatic sensitiveness to all possible facets of a new propaganda theme, is the only sure guide. In general, it can be said that a new psychological warfare approach should never be launched on the impulse of one individual. The proposed theme should be subjected to the scrutiny of the widest possible variety of area experts and all possible repercussions (present and future) analyzed. The decision to launch the new theme should be made after all the advantages have been weighed against the disadvantages.

Chapter 5

DISSEMINATION

58. **STRESS MUST BE LAID ON DISSEMINATION.** The vital final link in the chain of steps which takes our psychological warfare material to its target is the dissemination of our printed matter. The time, effort and expense which go into the planning and production of our literature will have been wasted unless the leaflets and newspapers get into the hands of those for whom they were intended. Too much emphasis cannot be laid on the importance of dissemination, because there is a natural tendency to underscore policy and planning, to provide adequately for preparation and production of texts, to subconsciously take for granted that the job is completed when the finished leaflet or newspaper comes off the press. If the chain is broken there, the operation will have failed. The problems of dissemination, both mechanical and personal, are just as delicate and just as complicated as in other phases of the operation and require the attention of skilled and talented personnel. Intelligently organized and efficiently operated dissemination needs the same emphasis as the other steps in the process.

59. LONG-RANGE BOMBER IS PRIMARY DISSEMINATION MEDIUM. In the foreseeable future, the long-range bomber will continue to be the primary medium for the dissemination of strategic psychological warfare printed matter. There are occasions when it may be desired to deliver this material to enemy front-line troops and for this purpose artillery leaflet shells may be used. However, in most instances the targets will be areas far behind the front lines and aircraft are the only means of getting the material to them. The organization of the Air Force's part of the operation and its smooth investigation into the overall operation is essential. The successful execution of this part of the enterprise will depend in large measure on the skill, tact and ingenuity of the psychological warfare's corps air liaison officers. The first step is to arrange for the official cooperation of the theater air force headquarters, have appropriate directives issued by it, and establish particularly close liaison with A-3. Most of the actual operational arrangements will be made with lower headquarters, but it is imperative that theater air force headquarters be generally familiar with these negotiations and give covering authorization for their execution.

60. SPECIAL "FLYING NEWSBOY" AIR UNITS The experience of World War II showed that it is better to have special air force units designated as "Flying Newsboys" and devote their entire time to leaflet and newspaper dissemination. There are very special problems in leaflet delivery which require the attention of specialists. A unit which knows that its sole function will be leaflet dissemination can be indoctrinated to take great pride in its work and will develop an *esprit de corps* which cannot be obtained when leaflet missions are sporadic and secondary to the primary job of dropping bombs. When special air force units are specifically designated as leaflet-delivery groups, the problem of air liaison with psychological warfare is greatly simplified. The psychological warfare air liaison officer should visit the unit regularly (and even live there for extended periods of time) and see to it that all personnel of the unit understands the significance of psychological warfare and the importance of the work the air unit is doing. He should, however, confine his activities to those of adviser, leave the actual execution of the operations to the staff of the air force unit and avoid every appearance of "telling" them how to do their jobs. His task is a very delicate one and requires both personality and diplomacy.

61. INCIDENTAL LEAFLET MISSIONS BY BOMB-DROPPING AIR UNITS. It is frequently desirable, in large-scale operations, to have a large number of air force units participate in the dissemination and include a percentage of leaflet bombs with their "pay load" of explosives. In such instances, the burden on the psychological warfare corps of air liaison officers is much heavier and more intricate. Much of the detail which would be "taken in stride" by the staff of a unit regularly employed in leaflet dissemination will have to be planned carefully by the air liaison

officers. If it is a special operation, a special directive (if a continuing operation, a continuing directive) must be sent by theater air force headquarters to the particular air force involved. The Air Force then selects the units which will participate and passes instructions down the line. To avoid misunderstandings and failures in the chain of command, the psychological warfare air liaison officers should arrange to receive copies of directives (or instructions) at each step in the process.

62. INDOCTRINATION OF THE LEAFLET-DROPPING AIR UNITS. No air unit should be brought into the leaflet dissemination picture until all staff and flying personnel have been thoroughly briefed on the significance of psychological warfare in general and of the importance of the upcoming mission in particular. If time and circumstances permit, briefings should be extended to the ground force personnel of the air unit, also. Within the limits of security, the background of each psychological warfare operation should be explained to them as well as its place in the overall picture. Since the psychological warfare air liaison officers will be the ones best qualified, they will ordinarily be called on to take charge of the indoctrination. Lectures and open forums should be supplemented with posters and booklets. Ample supplies of samples of each leaflet (with English translations) should be made available to the personnel of Air Force units engaged in leaflet dissemination. Americans are inveterate collectors of souvenirs and many airmen like to take collections of all leaflets dropped by their units. The experience of World War II showed that cooperation is much more enthusiastic and the smoothness of the mission is greatly increased when the above conditions are met. The technique of correct leaflet-dropping is just as complicated as the correct dropping of explosive bombs; if either missile fails to hit its target the mission cannot be considered a success. It has been proven that leaflet missions are really successful only when the personnel of the disseminating air unit has an intelligent grasp on the significance and importance of the mission it is performing. The time and effort spent in educating the personnel of the air force units in the contributions which are made by psychological warfare will pay large dividends in interested cooperation and improved performance. Like all human beings, the airmen are always anxious to know whether the work they are doing and have done is getting any results; it is highly advisable to prepare and distribute through all units engaged in leaflet-dropping a regular bulletin containing miscellaneous information on psychological warfare activities. This bulletin should be lively and readable, brightened by illustrations, cartoons, etc. It should contain comments of field commanders, enemy reaction as evidenced by radio answers or revealed by interrogation of prisoners, etc. Such bulletins provoke lively discussion in the air units and heighten their interest in psychological warfare activity.

63. IMPORTANCE OF EFFICIENT AIR LIASON. The air liaison officer is the key to successful leaflet delivery operations. As has been stated

(paragraphs 57 and 58), the extent of his duties will vary in accordance with whether the unit is engaged exclusively in leaflet-drop operations or is employed only occasionally for leaflet missions. In addition to his responsibility for indoctrination (see paragraph 62), the air liaison officer must be a "trouble shooter" and spare the air unit irritation over things which do not fall in its normal functions. In general, he must:

a. Set up with his parent organization a system which will insure efficient and smooth delivery to the air unit of properly packaged printed matter. Storage at the air unit, handling from warehouse to planes, the mechanics of the missions themselves are properly Air Force functions and should be handled by the personnel of the air unit.

b. See that air force headquarters understands precisely what is desired of psychological warfare on any particular mission so that suitable instructions will be issued and interlocking services smoothly meshed. It is important that instructions from the higher headquarters be detailed, clear and complete if confusion and complaint at the lower unit are to be avoided.

c. Be present at the air unit during briefing for each special mission to answer any questions which may arise concerning psychological warfare's interests in the mission.

When the air unit specializes in leaflet dissemination, much of this detailed liaison can be eliminated. When the unit takes part in leaflet missions only occasionally, very detailed liaison is required if the mission is to succeed in its purpose.

64. LEAFLET PACKAGES VS TIME-FUSED BOMBS. In the early days of World War II, psychological warfare leaflets were hand-dropped from the aircraft in packages. In addition to other objections to the package system, it was found that when free-flying leaflets are dropped from high altitudes they are carried so far by the wind before they reach the ground that any kind of accurate dissemination is impossible. And most strategic material disseminated by heavy and medium bombers was dropped from high altitudes over defended targets. It became apparent that the only really satisfactory answer was a time-fused leaflet bomb which could be dropped from the bomb-rack with fuse set to explode the bomb and eject the leaflets at a determined low altitude above ground level. With appropriate bombing-tables worked out for this item, the unsatisfactory aspects of leaflet-dropping could be eliminated. The leaflet bombs would be dropped in the same way as explosive bombs and the likelihood of hitting a desired target would be greatly increased.

65. LEAFLET BOMB T-1. Various Air Force ordnance agencies attacked the problem and experimented with different devices. The most satisfactory resulting item became known as Bomb, Leaflet, T-1. It is a modification of the M-26 parachute flare case, equipped with an M-111 (or

M-111A-1 or M-111A-2) clockwork time fuse backed by a charge of cordite. A 3" wooden block in the nose protected the rolls of leaflets against the explosion of the cordite and acted as a piston to drive the leaflet rolls out of the tail of the casing. The M-26 flare case is 50" long and 8" in diameter. When standard size (5"x8") leaflets were packed rolls 7½" in diameter it was found that the space behind the wooden block would hold seven such rolls. They should be wrapped with strips of heavy paper to hold them together until time of explosion. The number of leaflets per roll varies somewhat in accordance with the thickness of the paper, but the average is 10,000-11,000 leaflets. The weight of the loaded bomb is 65 pounds. A complete description of this bomb is found in War Department Technical Bulletin TB9X, dated 18 September 1944. The fuse is set to discharge the leaflets at approximately 1000 feet above and upwind of the target area. Since the leaflets are carried along by the wind after they become free-flying, it is necessary to select a point of burst to windward based on the ground wind velocity at the time. The table in Figure 31 gives the approximate drift of leaflets, assuming 1000 feet to the the height of burst.

66. LEAFLET BOMB T-1 IS NOT IDEAL. Leaflet Bomb T-1 was the most successful of the leaflet bombs evolved during World War II and was widely used in both Mediterranean and European Theaters of Operations. It is far from the perfect answer and its creators were the first to recognize that fact. In creating this item, the primary consideration was the stocks of materials available in quantity in overseas theaters and whether these stocks could be spared by the Air Force for leaflet dissemination without handicapping other air force operations. It is a remarkable instance of ordnance ingenuity in adapting for one purpose an item which had been created for another, but it is not the item which the originators would have selected if they had been creating a leaflet bomb "from scratch". The solid casing is not necessary and represents a waste of metal. Further, the solid casing can damage property and injure people in cases where this is not desired. The tail-ejection presents special problems. A weighted skeleton casing which would disintegrate along its entire length would be preferable. The M-26 casing is not of the size and shape to permit the most economical utilization of the bomb-rack space in current bombing aircraft. Various other objections could be enumerated.

67. OTHER DEVICES. In the closing years of the war, two other modifications of existing items of equipment were developed into leaflet bombs. Leaflet Bomb T-2 is an adaptation of the M-15 Adapter Cluster case. Leaflet Bomb T-3 is a similar adaptation of the larger M-16 Adapter Cluster case. These were field-tested at air force proving grounds and bombing tables were prepared, but the experimental work was completed so close to war's end that the items were never used operationally. They represent an advance over Leaflet Bomb T-1. Air Force ordnance is now developing time-fused leaflet bombs which are specifically designed for this work,

DRIFT OF LEAFLETS

Spgeed of Wind (M.P.H.)	Miles	Yards
5	.416	720
10	.834	1440
15	1.02	1760
20	1.18	2020
25	1.32	2280
30	1.44	2480
35	1.56	2700
40	1.67	2880
45	1.77	3030
50	1.88	3200

FIGURE 31

which will be produced in quantity, and will certainly give more efficient performance than the "emergency" creations of World War II,—adaptations in the preparation of which the basic consideration had to be the kind and stocks of manufactured equipment already on hand.

68. **LOW ALTITUDE OPERATIONS.** There will always be some instances where local conditions make it possible for aircraft to deliver their loads of paper from a low altitude over the target (i. e., areas not defended by anti-aircraft fire or fighter planes). In such cases, it is obviously wasteful in time and cost to make use of leaflet bombs; packages are cheaper to prepare and easier to handle and hand-dropping can be approximately as satisfactory if it is done from an altitude of not over 2000 feet. When free-flying leaflets are dropped from low altitudes, they should be dropped well upwind of intended target. A free-flying leaflet of standard size (5" x 8") falls 1000 feet in 5 minutes. A double sheet (i. e., 4-page leaflet of same dimensions) falls 1000 feet in 3½ minutes. Modification of the table in Figure 31 will give an approximation of how far upwind of target the drop should be made, depending on the altitude of drop and the ground wind velocity of the moment.

69. **LEAFLET SHELL.** There are rare occasions when need exists to deliver strategic psychological warfare leaflets to enemy forward troops. In such instances, artillery-fired leaflet shells offer the best means of accurate delivery. The item used in World War II was a modification of the 105 mm base-ejection smoke shell. The smoke-powder charge was removed and small rolls of leaflets inserted in the empty space. A small explosive charge in the nose is set off at the right instant by the time-fuse and drives the leaflets out of the rear of the shell. The principle is the same as in Leaflet Bomb T-1. Very small quantities of leaflets can be delivered in this way but they can be placed "on the doorstep". Because of the small quantities of material which can be distributed by leaflet shells and because of the nature of the audience which can be reached by them, this mode of distribution is usually employed only by the tactical teams. In such rare instances as this method of distribution is employed by the strategic team, channels set up by the tactical team should be utilized. Proper packing, efficient delivery, and completely clear instructions are just as important in dealing with the artillery units as they are in dealing with the Air Force units.

70. **RESOURCEFULNESS IN MEETING UNEXPECTED SITUATIONS.** *a.* In dissemination, as in other operations, only general rules and indications can be given. In wartime, local situations arise which have to be solved by the imagination and ingenuity of the local personnel. Much depends on the talents of the liaison officers who are the people in the best position to make a comparative study of the problems of one branch as related to those of another and to enlist the resources of other branches to

assist psychological warfare. By way of illustration of resourcefulness in solving a unique problem, the following case is offered:

b. At a certain point in the Burma Campaign, the only aircraft available for leaflet dissemination were several P-40 fighters. Gasoline was scarce and the number of leaflets which could be carried in the cockpit of a fighter was small. Further, the pilots objected to having to open the cockpit and throw out leaflets with one hand while controlling the plane with the other. Villages were scattered, the number of inhabitants in each one was small. It was desired to have each plane "tour" a large number of villages every trip, dropping small quantities of leaflets over each one. An engineer unit came to the rescue by adapting a 75-gal. gasoline overload tank into a "leaflet belly tank" which could be shackled under the fuselage of a fighter. The tail of the tank was severed and the opening closed by two flaps which were held shut by two strong springs fastened to the inside of the tank. A track was laid through the length of the tank and on the track loosely-bound packages could be placed end to end. In the nose of the tank there was installed a small electric motor connected with a button on the control panel in the cockpit. This motor operated a piston which forced the line of leaflet packages to the rear and through the spring-controlled flaps. When the loosely-bound package hit the slipstream, it disintegrated. By the length of time he held his finger on the button, the pilot could control the number of leaflet packages to be ejected over any given village in accordance with the reported population. With this device, it became possible to "circularize" ten to fifteen villages in a single flight, with a minimum of risk and inconvenience to the pilot.

Chapter 6

RADIO PROPAGANDA

71. THE RADIO AS A MEDIUM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. The radio is now accepted as the most effective medium of long-range, strategic psychological warfare, both during the preliminary "cold war" period and during the war itself. This is true not only because the radio can reach a much larger audience and reach it more regularly than can printed matter, but because a skillful appeal to the ear makes a deeper impression on the mind than an equally skillful appeal to the eye. Students of psychology of advertising have long accepted the conclusion that the ear is the most sensitive of all the human organs in terms of its effect on the mind. Investigations by "listening research" departments of the various broadcasting services reveal that the public reacts in a much more personal way to radio programs than it does to articles in newspapers. Under wartime conditions, people in the occupied countries clung to their radio sets with a sort of desperate ingenuity as their only spiritual release from bondage. Prior to the invasion of Normandy, we had figured that most of

the radio sets there would have been confiscated by the Germans and prepared large stocks for distribution immediately after the arrival of allied troops; this proved an unnecessary measure, as most of the people had access to radio reception. The human voice is an instrument of almost magical power to influence thinking; when it is carefully modulated to fit the emotional level desired and when its appeal is carefully blended with appropriate musical selections, only the "toughest" individualists will not fall under its spell sooner or later.

72. HOW TO INITIATE A SERIES OF PROGRAMS. Psychological warfare by radio is governed by the same basic principles which hold true in other media of propaganda. In the initial stages of a campaign a pleasant, mild and confidential tone is the best way to catch the attention of the listener and develop the habit of listening regularly to the program. If, at this point, the attitude of the radiocaster is too prejudiced or biased, unnecessary irritation and resistance will be developed in the mind of the listening audience. In the beginning, such suggestions as the propagandist wishes to convey must be carefully concealed in a mass of material designed to captivate the listening audience and take it into the speaker's confidence. The famous catch-phrase of the late President Roosevelt's early "Fireside Chats" ("My friends, and I know you are my friends") is a classic example of how to get the sympathetic attention of the audience. Once the audience has consented to listen, the initiative lies in the speaker's hands and he can apply all the principles of suggestion and persuasion, with all the complex modifications made possible by the sensitiveness of the human ear and the magic possibilities of the human voice.

73. RADIO APPEAL IS TO THE EMOTIONS. In radio activity, the emotional tone is more important than logical argument. The reader of printed matter is much more critical of faulty reasoning than is the radio listener. As a rule, people listen badly and many of the impressions received are unconscious rather than conscious. An excellent example of impressions received unconsciously is given by a story which came out of German-occupied Holland. There was a boy in the Hague who was in the habit of listening regularly to broadcasts from London and was so deeply impressed by what he heard that he whistled English dance tunes in the street without realizing he was doing so. He was unconscious of what he was doing, but the German police identified him at once as a listener to foreign broadcasts.

74. UNREASONING NATURE OF RADIO PUBLIC IN TIMES OF STRESS. In times of great public tension, people at large are even more unreasoning than normally about accepting as fact what is presented to them over the radio. The material must be presented skillfully, of course, and have at least a surface appearance of authenticity. As an example, we recall the famous Orson Welles broadcast of an invasion of the earth by the men from Mars in the fall of 1938. This came soon after the Munich

crisis, when the international political situation was strained and people were hyper-sensitive to any suggestion of an invasion. This very realistic presentation of an impossible event, stage-managed by a master-craftsman in the field of sound effects, produced a panic in some elements of the population in certain parts of the country. Moving vans were piled with furniture and people jammed the highways in a frantic effort to escape from the reported points of invasion. Even less hysterical citizens were shaken by the broadcast and newspaper offices were flooded with telegrams and telephone calls demanding confirmation or denial of the broadcast.

75. **THREE CARDINAL PRINCIPLES.** In psychological warfare by radio, then, it is vital to bear in mind that the:

a. Audience must be won by a warm friendly approach which will disarm the listener's suspicions and make him feel that the broadcaster is his friend and ally.

b. Emotional tone is just as important—if not more important—as the logic of the arguments presented. Voice effects and sonic accompaniments must be selected and molded with this consideration in mind.

c. Unconscious impressions received by the listener are as numerous and important as those received consciously. This is much more true of appeals to the ear alone than it is of printed matter and constitutes the chief difference between the radio approach and the leaflet-newspaper approach.

76. **TECHNIQUE OF RADIO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.** With the above three considerations in mind, the principles governing the conduct of psychological warfare by radio are the same as those used in other media. Repetition is of the essence; it eventually produces a kind of hypnotic effect. Actually, the formula does not have to be changed as often as it does in printed matter; the same slogan can be used over a much longer time with advantageous results. Witness the successful use in our commercial advertising of slogans which become "signatures" in certain programs, i. e., "ABC—Always Buy Chesterfields." The notion of authenticity and consistency is also important, although the clever propagandist can take more liberties with this factor on the radio than he can in printed matter. The effect of a radio statement is impermanent, can be colored by voice tone and context, and cannot be "thrown back" at the user with the same effectiveness as can a printed statement. Choice of words and phrases is highly important and more vivid emotional coloring can be given to them on the radio than can be done in print.

77. **USE OF RADIO IN WORLD WAR I.** It was in World War I that we find the first systematic use of the radio as a medium to influence mass opinion. That war was the first "total war"—not only in its mobilization of manpower and industrial resources—but also in the organized use of

the psychological weapon of propaganda. The fact that the efforts were halting and awkward, that radio technology was in its infancy, that the role played was a relatively minor one should not deceive us as to its historical importance. Because, from these puny beginnings there was built a structure which has placed a new and murderous weapon in the hands of the wielders of "total war."

78. GERMAN USE OF THE RADIO IN WORLD WAR I. The Germans turned to the radio in World War I for the simple reason that the Allies controlled the trans-Atlantic cables and the radio was their only means of transmitting their version of the news to the outside world. They offered free news services to papers in neutral countries when British and American concerns were charging stiff fees for these same services. Thus they secured an outlet for the German interpretation of the news of the world.

79. DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE 1920's. During the 1920's all of the European nations became more and more acutely aware of the coming role of the radio in the field of international politics. The Russians made extensive use of it in consolidating the results of the Bolshevik revolution. While most of the Russian effort was concentrated in the Soviet Union itself, we find them making the first tentative steps in the international field: i. e., during the Bela Kun uprising in Hungary in 1919, during the Polish "incident" in 1920, during the dispute with Rumania over Bessarabia in 1926, and during the British general strike in 1930. During the late 1920's and the early 1930's, the various European countries with overseas colonies set up short-wave broadcasting services: Holland, France, England, Belgium, and Portugal. Even little Switzerland and Czechoslovakia set up "cultural" short-wave services for their former nationals residing in other countries. At this stage, the intent of these overseas services was not aggressive, but simply to bind the colonies and former nationals more closely to the mother countries. Nor was there at this stage any intent to extend these services to interested parties in other countries, although this would follow inevitably as a matter of course. The League of Nations established its outlet (*Radio-Nations*) in 1932 to expound the doctrine of internationalism and it actually helped organize world opinion for the sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian war. But, in general, its programs were dull and poorly constructed, all fundamental rules of applied psychology were neglected, and the institution was not a success.

80. SYSTEMATIZED USE OF RADIO BY JAPANESE AND GERMANS. The first large-scale use of the radio as a psychological weapon in support of actual warfare was made by the Japanese in the years following the outbreak of the China "incident". Stations were established in Manchukuo to broadcast programs manufactured partly or wholly in Japan and large numbers of free receiving sets were distributed among the people. The fact that many of the proud owners of the free Japanese sets preferred to tune in on the strong Chinese station at Nanking was not

part of the plan. But, it was the coming to power of the Nazis in Germany in 1933—and the installation of Josef Goebbels as propaganda chief—that the full use of radio as a potent weapon of aggressive foreign policy entered its present-day phase. The German radio became closely geared to the Reich's political intentions; it was used cynically to persuade and delude, to terrorize and mesmerize the particular public to which its programs were beamed. Like Mrs. Grundy, it became "all things to all men." It twisted and turned to preserve some semblance of consistency in the various stories it told, but held it more important that the particular programs have the desired effect on the people for whom they were prepared. Herr Goebbels and Co. hoped that perhaps the inconsistencies wouldn't be noticed and compared by enough people to make any difference; that was a gamble which had to be taken. The Nazi planners had a very low opinion of the reasoning power of the mass of the people and it was in influencing the masses that they were especially interested.

81. THE GERMAN RADIO "SYSTEM" UNDER JOSEF GOEBBELS. Every trick in the bag was brought into play in the course of this diabolically clever campaign. Dignified "straight" news programs were mixed with the rankest sort of rumor-mongering and outright lies until the unsuspecting listener was left in a state of complete confusion. In the first category (and this constituted the bulk of the material) were the official communiques of the Army and the government, pronouncements by recognized commentators like General Dietrich and a large volume of non-controversial news, much of which was repeated from BBC and American stations. In the second category were tricky feature items, "traitor" broadcasts like those of the British William Joyce and the American Douglas Chandler, "planted" programs which seemed to emanate from neutral countries but were really concoctions of German-controlled news sources in those countries, "ghost" programs which were broadcast on the same wave-lengths as well known British and American stations, open falsifications of news items which they claimed to have taken from BBC, etc. Overseas listeners were reassured as to Germany's peaceful intentions once her "legitimate" claims had been satisfied,—while her home public was told frankly that the goal was world domination. Each movement of aggression was prepared carefully by a preliminary radio campaign; a steadily "stepped up" radio barrage reached hysterical proportions just before the actual movement of the armed forces took place; once the event had transpired a grave, calm and unruffled campaign explained logically why the move had been necessary and inevitable.

82. THE BRITISH LEARN SLOWLY. This intricate and powerful German campaign drove the British radio to successful competition more rapidly than it might have developed otherwise. Even so, and despite the advantage given them by having used the radio for political purposes during World War I, British radio efforts lagged far behind the elaborate German campaign. It was not until after the catastrophe of Dunkirk that the Brit-

ish began to make "all out" use of the radio as a weapon of political warfare. As early as 1932 BBC had established an Overseas Service for the Empire and the United States; this was merely an expansion of the Home Service of BBC. The programs were dull and the tempo leisurely. Very little attention was paid to making the material appealing to English-speaking audiences whose tastes were different from those of the British themselves. Compared to the sprightly tone of the competitive American radio, the British offerings were colorless and Americans did not care for these warmed-over scraps of an original British meal. BBC programs in languages other than English had the same defects. They were simple translations (often poorly done and delivered with a strong British accent) of what had been given the British audience. Scant attention was paid to the special tastes of the country or countries for which a given program had been prepared.

83. **BRITISH WEAKNESSES IN THE PRE-DUNKIRK ERA.** In the pre-Dunkirk phase, the intellectual tone of the British radio made its appeal to a necessarily limited audience. Indeed, while BBC made some progress in the field of popularization later on, we must confess that the restrained traditionalism characteristic of the British "upper classes" distinguishes their radio offerings of that day from those of other nations. Where the German radio made its appeal to the masses (as the American radio still does, but for a different reason), the British seem to have, consciously or unconsciously, arrived at the conclusion that it is more important to strengthen old ties and win new friends among "the people who count"—among those who guide the destinies of nations. But, the greatest weakness of British radio technique in the period before Dunkirk was that it let the Germans define the issues and accepted the enemy formulation of the problem. The Nazis presented the struggle as a clash between the decadent "old system" and the vital "new order," as a battle between plutocrats and proletariat. Having let the enemy assign the roles in the cast, BBC attempted to defend the benefits and political freedom of the democratic system. They made the mistake of not attacking the position which the Nazis had assigned to themselves. To military men, the following two points are axioms:

a. When you elect to go on the defensive, you select your own defensive position; you avoid at all costs letting the enemy choose it for you.

b. Very frequently a strong counter-attack is more effective (and in the long run less costly) than a prolonged and purely static defense. In the early days of their radio war with the Nazis, the British committed both of these errors. As a result, many open-minded listeners in all countries, influenced by the hypnotic repetition of the German radio, came to feel that the "new order" might contain some good points. It was only much later that the British radio, belatedly aware of its error, began to expose the fallacies of the German argument.

84. THE NEW BRITISH RADIO CAMPAIGN. In mid-1940 British political warfare by radio entered a new phase. We might say that this development parallels a general regeneration of British attitude which took place under Winston Churchill's vigorous leadership. The old defensive attitude disappeared. J. B. Priestly and others tore to pieces the myth of the "Nordic superman" and attacked the Nazis as bullies, gangsters, and neurotics. German claims of a bright new world were contrasted with concentration camps and crematoria. BBC began to flood Europe with foreign-language broadcasts designed to give heart to partisans in all countries under German control and to stiffen neutrals in their resistance to nazi-fascist intimidation. Overseas programs to all countries took on a more attractive form and were tailored for the particular audiences which they were intended to influence. In short, BBC got down to serious business in the use of the radio as an instrument of political warfare and its campaign was closely geared to the fighting war effort of an aroused British nation. The Political Warfare Executive (PWE) and the Ministry of Information (MOI) meshed their activities and BBC became their official organ of expression. Political warfare was organized and channelized and the result was a streamlined weapon of high caliber. BBC programs continued to be marked by an air of restrained dignity and there was never any of the hysterical caterwauling so frequent in the outpourings of the German radio. Any loss in emotional appeal was compensated by a reputation for steadiness and dependability. Thinking people the world over (including many Americans) formed the habit of tuning in on BBC for the calmest and most authentic presentation of the world situation. And it was to this type of audience that the major effort of BBC was always directed.

85. THE UNITED STATES ENTERS THE FIELD. At the time this country entered World War II, our experience in the use of radio political warfare was negligible. We had been foremost in the general and technical evolution of radio and we had developed radio advertising into a fine art, but we had never made use of the radio as an instrument of international politics. This seems strange when we realize that we had been one of the main targets of the political warfare of other nations throughout the decade of the 1930's. The explanation lies in part in the isolationism which characterized our foreign policy during this era. The disillusionment which followed World War I led this nation to want to separate itself as far as possible from "international entanglements." The second factor was that our radio industry was organized on the basis of private ownership and individual enterprise. The competing chains understood and executed brilliantly their separate campaigns of commercial advertising, but the concept of national political warfare involved the idea of centralized control which they feared and would have resisted with every resource at their disposal; in this resistance they would have been supported by the overwhelming sentiment of the American public. Further, the very idea of propaganda is distasteful to our people as a whole and its use as an instrument of national policy would have been interpreted as official interfer-

ence in the affairs of other nations; all of this was in conflict with the "hands off" policy which prevailed at that time. Proof of this basic dislike for "propaganda" and for centralized control is given by the opposition which the Office of War Information (OWI) encountered throughout its existence, an opposition which resulted eventually in the liquidation of the agency in the latter part of 1945.

86. ORGANIZATION FOR WARTIME PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE BY RADIO. With the need for psychological warfare facilities apparent and pressing, various agencies were established and authorized to carry out specified functions. The Office of War Information, in close cooperation with the Departments of State, Army and Navy, came to be the clearing house of policy directives governing the conduct of our part of the Allied radio campaign. Short-wave stations were operated by the OWI in New York and San Francisco. However, as the British and Germans had already discovered, under present conditions of technology and reception facilities short-wave radio can only be considered as an important supplementary activity. In most of the countries to be reached, too few people own short-wave receiving sets to make it possible to talk to a large audience. BBC and the German radio were able to "blanket" the desired areas on standard wave lengths; it was necessary for us to find means of doing the same thing. This meant that actual broadcasting operations of strategic radio activity had to be transferred to the theaters of operations. A certain amount of the more elaborate script and program production could be done in this country by teams of experts, but the actual transmission had to be handled by the Theater Psychological Warfare Division from standard wave-length stations. Post-war investigation revealed that very few Japanese had heard our short-wave programs from San Francisco; it was only after we started transmitting from a standard wave length station on Saipan that our programs began to reach large numbers of Japanese. Further, the bulk of the programs can be produced better in the theaters (in conformity with policy directives, of course) because they are so much closer to the latest developments.

87. BRITISH-AMERICAN COOPERATION IN THE RADIO FIELD. In the European and Mediterranean Theaters, radio sections (like all other sections of psychological warfare divisions) were composed of mixed American-British military-civilian personnel. It is only fair to say that in the early days the British were far ahead of us in the field of radio political warfare and we learned a lot from them. This was true to such an extent that American officials and propagandists often complained that the British were running the joint activity in their own national interest. The charge was unjust. The British had a long start on us and their policy-intelligence-operation integration was more highly developed than our own. When the Americans seemed without clear policies or propaganda purposes, it was natural that the British should take the lead and let the Americans follow if they wished. In fact, we benefited immensely from

the association, and toward the end of the war our contribution to the collaborative effort was of quite as high a quality as that of the British.

88. AMERICAN OVERSEAS STATIONS. In northern Europe BBC was our chief outlet in the years preceding the Normandy invasion. A great many programs were prepared in collaboration with the British, but time was also allotted for exclusively American broadcasts. During the war a chain of new stations (ABSIE: American Broadcasting Stations in Europe) went into operation under American control. Captured stations (the very important Radio Luxembourg) were repaired and activated. In North Africa, Radio Algiers was for a long time the outlet for "Voice of America" programs in the Mediterranean area. The French colonial authorities also gave us all the time we requested on lesser stations like Rabat and Tunis. Additional stations were constructed "from scratch." With the invasion of southern Italy, Radio Bari was captured intact and from there it was possible to cover adequately southeastern Europe and the Middle East as well as to give additional coverage of North Africa. At a later date the very powerful Radio Rome gave us an outlet in southern Europe almost as important as BBC was in the north. In the Asiatic theaters, various stations were constructed to broadcast to local populations. For instance, OWI had its own transmitting equipment from which it broadcast to the population of inner China. Here, as in other areas of Asia, there is considerable doubt as to whether the influence exerted justified the effort and expense. The scarcity of receiving sets in the areas in question eliminated one of the two essential factors of successful strategic psychological warfare (i. e., audience-volume plus insistent repetition). Japan was the one country where conditions were favorable for strategic radio activity, but, until Saipan was captured and a station erected there, we had at our disposal no standard wave station from which Japan could be reached. The short-wave programs from San Francisco were heard by a limited number of influential Japanese intellectuals, but there was no means of getting at the masses.

89. OUR WARTIME RADIO THEMES. Programs treated a set of standard themes: the rising power of the western democracies and hopelessness of the Axis cause: the absence of expansionist ambitions from our plans for the world of the future: our desire to see self-governing peoples live prosperously at peace with one another, etc. The periodic statements of plans and policy by responsible Allied leaders were read in all languages. Decisions of conferences of Allied leaders (Yalta, Teheran, etc.) were announced and explained. Musical shows and other features "dressed up" the programs, but the backbone was news, news, news. As the war progressed and the Allied successes followed on one another's heels, the programming became easier and less ingenuity was required to explain the progress of the war to neutrals and to enemy populations. Events spoke for themselves and the handwriting was on the wall for all to see. We had

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only to emphasize and underscore what the developments meant and to repeat our statements about our intentions for the post-war world.

90. CENTRALIZED POLICY CONTROL IS A "MUST." In radio work, as in other forms of psychological warfare, there must be established a source of highest level policy control under a single authority. When this control is lacking, various energetic separate agencies are likely to indulge in conflicting statements; this makes for a confused and vacillating policy which can even produce dangerous situations. If too much freedom of low-level policy formulation is permitted, there arise duplications, contradictions and lack of integration of the work of the different agencies. To achieve the fullest effectiveness of psychological warfare, it is imperative that there be close coordination between policy, intelligence and operations. This can be obtained only when the policy is clear and consistent.

91. PERSONNEL SHOULD BE MILITARY. Insofar as possible, the personnel of psychological warfare at the theater level (as well as at lower levels) should be military. Some civilian-technicians and civilian-political advisers will probably always be necessary, but experience has shown that a civilian-dominated agency does not (and cannot) work well in an area under military control where all other activities are operated by the Army. For this reason, the Army must train in peacetime a personnel qualified to fill most of the jobs of psychological warfare divisions in the overseas theaters. The larger the percentage of jobs in psychological warfare divisions which can be staffed immediately with army personnel, the greater are the chances of immediate and continuing successful functioning of these divisions. When qualified technical personnel is not available in army circles and it is necessary to bring them in from civilian life, they should be incorporated in the Army insofar as possible. The civilian element in a unit operating in an area under military control should be held to the lowest possible minimum.

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